FROM HAMANN TO KIERKEGAARD

1st Workshop of the Project
Experimentation and Dissidence

Editors
José Miranda Justo
Elisabete M. de Sousa
Fernando M. F. Silva



CENTRE FOR PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LISBON
2017

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experimentation & dissidence

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INTRODUCTION

This e-volume takes its title – *From Hamann to Kierkegaard* – from the first Workshop of the project called Experimentation and Dissidence which took place in Lisbon on the 15–16 December 2016. This three-year project (PTDC/MHC-FIL/1416/2014), which began in May 2016 is run by the Centre for Philosophy at the University of Lisbon and is supported by the Portuguese Foundation for the development of Science and Technology (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P.).

The keywords of the project – Experimentation and Dissidence – refer not only to the philosophical content but also act as guidelines for research. Hence, the focus throughout the duration of the project will be the investigation and publication of philosophers and other authors who have opened new ways of thinking outside the limits of mainstream philosophy and its practices. These authors may cover different periods and still share traits, inasmuch as they can be described as authors who have generated, and continue to generate, thought processes that experiment with alternative types of reflective discourse, and which, in their singularity, diverge from established and more commonly accepted ways of finding a problem and problem solving. From Hamann to Kierkegaard, from Kierkegaard to Nietzsche, from Nietzsche to Heidegger, and from Heidegger to Debord, Deleuze or Derrida, we wish to accompany the series of turning points which, in Western modernity, has been sketching a kind of multidirectional and polymorphic history of differential moments in opposition to the main trend(s) of philosophical endeavors.

Concerning methodology, we also take experimentation and dissidence as guidelines in the choice of researchers and the corresponding choice of research topics, as well as in the type of scientific events. *From Hamann to Kierkegaard* is the first of four workshops in which all have a flexible organizational pattern that allows participants to present and to discuss

research, evaluate results and to plan future work. Seven papers were presented and discussed publically on the first day of Workshop 1 at the National Library in Lisbon; and on the second day, a private discussion on scientific and organizational issues took place at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the University of Lisbon, bringing together the organizers and the project's consultants.

The present e-volume contains the texts of the seven presentations of the first day, which is the first set of essays resulting from research and the subsequent discussion, and which are aimed at addressing crucial topics in the global field mentioned above. José Miranda Justo examines Johann Georg Hamann's hermeneutical approach to the problem of language and the author's criticism of the language of philosophy. Gualtiero Lorini distinguishes Wolff's and Baumgarten's approaches to psychology stressing the latter's employment of the I within the *Psychologia empirica*, which can be regarded as testifying to his deeper concern of the knowing subject in his sensible experience. Fernando Silva, drawing on Kant's revolutionary propositions in the Lectures on Anthropology, observes the topics of memory, imagination, fantasy and wit, which play an important part in the fulfillment of Kant's greater intention in the field, namely, to reconfigure each of these faculties *per se* and in their relations, and to create harmony between inferior and superior faculties, thereby ensuring a "sane human spirit". Alison Assiter engages with Kierkegaard's (or Haufniensis') solution to a problem faced by Kant – the problem of how it is possible freely to do wrong; according to Assiter's penetrating analysis, Kierkegaard in *The Concept of Anxiety* offers an approach to freedom that does not lead to Kant's problem but rather maintains Kant's conception of freedom. Laura Llevadot and Juan Evaristo Valls delve deeply into Kierkegaard's approach to reading a text and the challenges in the metaphysics of reading, which still remains generally unexplored; in their article, the authors produce a provocative and updated analysis of the ways in which Kierkegaard questions the idea of a book as a unitary work throughout his prolific writings. Bartholomew Ryan directly addresses the challenge of experimentation and dissidence and reads Kierkegaard as a "dramatic philosopher" creating "a new landscape that allows himself and the reader to penetrate deeper into the plurality of the subject". Elisabete M. de Sousa produces a startling and careful thesis on the possibility of reading

Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* as an experiment in the genre "Bildungsroman", of which Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* is the prototype.

To conclude this short introduction, I wish to express my thanks to the Centre for Philosophy at the University of Lisbon for all their support, and to the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, for the funding of the project and its activities. Special thanks are also due to all participants in this first workshop and especially to the other members of the organizing committee, Elisabete M. de Sousa and Fernando Silva, for their commitment to the development of this workshop and project and in the preparation and publication of this volume.

José Miranda Justo

Main Researcher of the Project E and D
February 2017

JOHANN GEORG HAMANN: INTERPRETATION AND LANGUAGE

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Abstract
Hamann's understanding of language has seldom been treated from the point of view of hermeneutics, which is in my opinion the one that can better accentuate the author's specificity in his days and his influence for posterity.
Hamann clearly begins his exocentric reflections with the problem of how to produce sense out of a situation of deficit of sense. His attitude, since the London Writings, which he never published in his lifetime, is deeply marked by that at the time unusual perspective which I characterize as a pan-hermeneutics since Hamann considers every aspect of life, including knowledge, history, culture, religion or philosophy, as being based on the production of sense.
Language is for Hamann an integrant part of the process of interpretation that leads to the construction of blocks of sense which are primarily imagistic and to a certain extent unstable or precarious, and for this reason demand a metaphorical mechanism of substitution of an image (or set of images) for another image (or another complex of images).
I conclude my paper by showing that Hamann's conception of interpretation and language is a relevant key for the understanding of the author's radical criticism of the Enlightenment including the philosophy of Kant.

Keywords
Hamann, hermeneutics, sense, language, criticism of Enlightenment

1.

The reading of Hamann's London Writings (1758) introduces us to some main factors of the author's thinking, which will prevail along his oeuvre. The first factor that I would like to stress is the hermeneutical idea of the

construction of sense out of a situation of deficit of sense. Let me begin by quoting a passage from the "Thoughts on the course of my life":

> Under the tumult of all the passions that overwhelmed me to the point that so often I could not find breath I repeatedly asked God for a friend, a sage and just friend whose image was no longer known to me. […] A friend who could give me a key into my heart, the driving thread of my labyrinth… this was a desire which I so many times formulated not understanding well its content.[1]

Instead of being only a particular declaration about a private situation of despair, this passage contains indeed, in an extremely synthetic formulation, all the elements that characterize Hamann's hermeneutical approach. These elements are articulated in two triadic groups linked with one another: the first group unites physical feeling, interior feeling and thinking; the second group unites desire, friendship and sense.

We can begin by acknowledging that the problem of sense only arises when a lack of sense is experienced. Sense is precisely what we constitute every time we overtake a situation of disorientation, of what level it might be. This means that sense is not a stabilized and independent entity, being so to say previous to our experience. On the contrary, sense is a production of ours, an individual activity of transformation of an experience of missing or lacking. Once this is said we can now proceed to a characterization of the first triad: as experience involves the whole being – body, affects and intelligence –, the transformation of the painful experience of the lack of sense also involves those three instances. Without the generation of an uneasiness at the three levels the conditions are not reunited for a possible gain of sense; and the surpassing of such an uneasiness is not possible if the three levels do not cooperate in a productive manner. The second triad is entangled with the first one. The painful experience of the deficit of sense is immediately a desire, a searching desire, but above all a kind of desire that looks around looking for a consonance, looking for another being that can guarantee that the effort is not vain; that other being offers, not an entire response, but an extremity of the thread that leads to the way out of the "labyrinth", this is to say a "key" which opens to the constituting of a sense that progressively (re)organizes us.

[1] LS, 342; N II, 39 (my translation). For abbreviations see references.

In the dramatically depressive situation that Hamann experienced in London the "friend" was to be found "inside my heart" by rereading the Bible and by annotating "the thoughts that during the reading would come to me". This is to say that the other, the friend, can be a person, but can also be a text or any piece of discourse. The important matter is that a dialogical relationship is needed in order to establish the bridge uniting desire and sense. This dialogical instance – be it personal or textual – is a crucial factor in Hamann's conception of interpretation as a production of sense. Without it there would be no constitution of sense and consequently no reorganization of the self since the instance of desire would be incapable of any movement. The Other of the dialogical relationship has the power to stimulate the self because it provides opposition, interrogation and discursive retrial, this is to say, all the elements of practical, activated, living discourse.

Every aspect that I have mentioned until here is grounded on a supposition: the experience of a personal crisis of sense and of its surpassing is to be understood as a major event, and other sense events have to be understood in its dependency. Contrary to what was and still is commonly accepted in the various domains of philosophy, Hamann does not think from generality to individuality; his thinking clearly starts at the level of the individual self and at the level of the singularity of experience which is determined by individual modes of experience. The transposition to other levels is not supported by deduction or induction but instead by means of a totally different procedure: analogy.[2] This means that the process of interpretation – or sense construction – related to situations such as everyday experiences of reinterpretation of facts or words, the orientation and reorientation of our acting, the constitution of a personal sense in the reading of any type of text, be it a philosophical one, can and must be seen in analogy to the dramatically individual and painful experience of the loss of sense and of the reconstruction of sense.

Adopting this point of view, Hamann's conception of sense – which is to a certain extent based on the traditional idea of the three books, the book of nature, the book of history and the book of books (the Bible), allowing

[2] In a footnote to the *Socratic Memorabilia*, Hamann quotes Edward Young: "Analogy, man's surest guide below", Night 6.

for a circularity of analogical movements[3] that open the way to all sorts of interpretative constructions – can be called, as I have suggested before, a pan-hermeneutics since the author considers every aspect of life, including knowledge, history, culture, religion or philosophy, as being exposed to processes and procedures of sense production.

2.

I have mentioned above the crucial role of the dialogical instance and of discourse in Hamann's approach. Now I would like to turn my attention to the topics of human language and its constitutive role. But we should not forget that these two topics are entirely dependent on the idea of sense and of the dialogical environment of any production of discourse. Discourse is, as we shall see, the living reality of human language, and this reality only exists as sense productivity in dialogical situations.

In his *Aesthetica in nuce* (1762) Hamann writes the following:

> Reden ist übersetzen – aus einer Engelsprache in eine Menschensprache, das heist, Gedanken in Worte, – Sachen in Namen, – Bilder in Zeichen; die poetisch oder kyriologisch, historisch, oder symbolisch oder hieroglyphisch — und philosophisch oder charakteristisch seyn können. Diese Art der Übersetzung (verstehe Reden) kommt mehr, als irgend eine andere, mit der verkehrten Seite von Tapeten überein,
> And shews the stuff, but not the workman's skill; oder mit einer Sonnenfinsternis, die in einem Gefäße voll Wassers in Augenschein genommen wird.

I have given this passage first in German (and only afterwards will I propose a translation) exactly because I wish to stress that Hamann is not writing about *speech* but about *discourse* (Rede): Hamann doesn't write "Sprechen ist übersetzen", but instead "Reden is übersetzen". This means that precisely when the author stresses the transpositional functioning of language (übersetzen) he is also underlining its living effectiveness: speech is supposed

[3] Hamann receives this conception from Bacon (see Sven-Aage Jørgensen, "Hamann, Bacon and Tradition", *Orbis Litterarum*, 16, 1961, pp. 48–73). However, what is crucial in Hamann's approach is the fact that the three books are regarded as being at the same level; this means that there is no hierarchical organization of the different domains and that the hermeneutic process is allowed to function effectively in terms of analogy.

to be an actualization of language, as if the abstract entity "language" were there first; discourse, on the contrary, is the living articulate creature that allows for the existence of languages as second-hand crystallizations.

Let's try a possible translation – as literal as it can be allowed – of the quoted passage:

> Discoursing is translating – from a language of angels into a language of humans, that is, thoughts in words – things in names – images in signals; that can be poetic or kyriological, historical, or symbolic or hieroglyphic — and philosophical or characteristic. This kind of translation (understand discourse) matches more than any other with the reverse side of tapestries, And shews the stuff, but not the workman's skill; or with an eclipse of the sun that is examined in a vessel full of water .[4]

The main aspect to be observed in this passage is that the transposition which is meant under the image of "translating" is not to be understood as a second-hand event. What does Hamann mean when he talks about a "language of angels" as opposed to a "language of humans"? This language of angels is constituted of "thoughts", "things" and "images". In this sense it is a *language*, which means that it is *articulate*, but it is pre-verbal. If the language of angels were not an articulate language the transposition to the language of humans would not be possible. This is to say that thoughts, things and images, being previous to verbal language, continue to exist in human language and are, so to say, developed in this kind of language. Thoughts, for instance, are only preverbal in the sense that they act like a kind of illumination that opens to the possibility of a more fully developed thinking which is organized by means of words and their syntactical enchainment. From this point of view we can say that human language, as a verbal event, is *constitutive* of thinking, although thoughts – or rather *some* thoughts – can be seen as preverbal. The same happens with "things" and "names". At a certain level things are preverbal, but they enter an organizational framework in that verbal language, through their naming, *constitutes* them as effective objects of our senses and our intelligence.

Even more interesting is the relation between "images" and "signs". Let

[4] My translation strongly differs from the one given in English by Gwen Griffith Dickson in her *Johann Georg Hamann's Relational Metacriticism*, Berlin / New York: De Gruyter 1995, p. 413.

me remember that in another passage of the *Aesthetica in nuce* Hamann writes the following: "The senses and the passions speak [*reden*, i.e. discourse] and understand nothing but images. In images consists the entire treasure of human cognition and blessedness." [5] This clearly shows that the role of images is inchoative in relation to signs. Images constitute already a kind of language which is responsible for "cognition and blessedness". This is to say that images, and the metaphorical transposition implied in the substitution of an image for another image which is responsible for the production of sense, are constitutive not only in what regards our cognitive processes but also in relation to something that is crucial from Hamann's point of view: our concrete existence as human beings who aspire to happiness and salvation and who exist in the middle of a dialogical relation with others.

But images, being constitutive as they are, are also able to open our way to the use of signs. And signs are responsible for the development of the constitutive role of images. The different kinds of signs that Hamann enumerates allow for the full efficiency of human language namely at three levels: the one of poetry, the one of history, and the one of philosophy. The level of poetry is of course the most archaic and corresponds to the most undeveloped processes of metaphorical substitution. The level of history corresponds to narrative, which is a further degree in the development of human language since it entails an increasing growth of the potentials of syntax. The level of philosophical signs corresponds to the development of abstraction, and in this sense to a maximum degree of the constitutive functions of human language.

Nevertheless, in Hamann's view, the level of philosophical signs has to be submitted to a work of criticism. The abstraction which is characteristic of this level leads most of the time to what Hamann considers to be the creation of *entia rationis*,[6] which are typical of philosophical discourse: entia rationis are artificial entities produced by reason alone, without any connection whatsoever with life, with concrete existence, with feelings and corporeal experience. The only possible criticism of the language of philosophy has to be enacted through the lower levels of abstraction, namely through the language of poetic signs. Poetry, and alongside with it analogy and irony (as

[5] NII, 197.

[6] NIII, 278.

they both are dealt with in the *Socratic Memorabilia*), are able to conduct a profound criticism of philosophical language and its *entia* not only because they interrogate the foundations of these *entia*, but also because they totally expose at daylight their incapacity of a truthful treatment of anything that relates to human "blessedness".

Hamann's *Metacritique of the Purism of Reason,* written in 1784, only four years before the author's death, is perhaps the best example of the implementation of such a criticism of philosophical language. Among other passages that could exemplify this criticism of philosophical language I shall choose one that, from the point of view that I adopt, seems to be central in two ways: firstly because it criticizes the language of philosophy precisely in its deepest roots, i.e. in the dependency of this language in relation to logics; secondly because it enunciates the constitutive role of current human language regarding logical functions. I quote:

> If a chief question, then, remains: *how is the faculty to think possible?* – The faculty to think *right* and *left*, *before* and *without*, *with* and *beyond* experience? then no deduction is necessary to prove the genealogical priority of *language* over the *seven* holy functions of logical propositions and inferences and their heraldic. Not only the entire faculty to think rests on language […]: *but language is also the central point of the misunderstanding of reason with itself*, partly because of the frequent coincidence of the greatest and smallest concept […], partly because of the infiniteness of the figures of discourse in relation to the figures of conclusion […].[7]

Hamann's declaration of the priority of human language over the logical functions is peremptory. Common language is not only irreducible to logical functions; it is constitutive of those functions, which have to be understood as a byproduct of that very same language. But the fact that Hamann refers the "heraldic" of "logical propositions and inferences" has a further significance: this "heraldic" is a typical hamannian manner – a "poetic" manner – of pointing to the *mathesis* which underlies the view that the Enlightenment has of the language of philosophy. The systematization of concepts established by means of a *mathesis* is a consequence of a separative and separated reason, i.e. a kind of reason which regards itself as capable of radically separating

[7] NIII, 278.

the different levels of analysis and that separates itself from other levels of experience establishing itself as an autonomous entity apt to develop a type of discourse totally convinced of its absolute certainty. And this certainty is characteristic of those versions of philosophical Enlightenment that – as is the case with I. Kant – believe to have been able of completely discovering "the point of the misunderstanding of reason with itself".[8]

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[8] Hamann's expression quotes directly I. Kant, KrV, A XII.

FROM *WE* TO *I*. THE RISE OF AESTHETICS BETWEEN RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Abstract
While Christian Wolff's empirical psychology is distinguished by its focus on what we can observe about the soul, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten concentrates on the case of the *I* (ego), or my soul. How does this affect the relationship between empirical and rational psychology? The intent of both authors is to start from the empirical data collected by empirical psychology, and then to move to a more abstract and formalistic justification of these data in rational psychology. However, despite the undeniable methodological relevance Wolff attributes to empirical data as the beginning of the cognitive process, rationalistic formalism still seems irreducible in his conception of experience. Baumgarten's rational psychology also cannot avoid relying on the observations and the consequent definitions stated in empirical psychology, but Baumgarten's employment of the *I* within the *Psychologia empirica* can be regarded as testifying to his deeper concern of the knowing subject in his sensible experience. Baumgarten's concept of experience, even if apparently similar to Wolff's, is indeed much more focused on the possibility of discovering a form of rationality that is peculiarly detectable from the sensible experience of the singular *I*. Thus, since Wolff's concept of perception still relies on attention, he partially underpins even the possibility of experience on purely rational principles. Baumgarten instead puts his treatment of the "Sensus" soon after the exposition of the inferior cognitive faculty, as an independent source of the "Scientia sensitive cognoscendi et proponendi", a discipline that he defines as *Aesthetics*.

Keywords
Wolff, Baumgarten, Kant, Psychology, Metaphysics

Introductory remarks

Works concerning A. G. Baumgarten's thought usually emphasize two main features. The first consists of his determination of aesthetics as a discipline in its own right, that is, as a discipline based on the emancipation of the empirical sphere from pure intellectual principles. The second concerns Kant's employment of Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* as a handbook for his lectures on metaphysics throughout his entire academic career (1762–1795). Certainly, these two points are connected. Indeed, on the one hand, many of the methodological premises of the *Aesthetica* are stated in the *Metaphysica*; and, on the other hand, the acknowledgment of an independent status for sensibility is one of the main claims of Kant's critical turn, although Kant's distance even from Baumgarten is clear on this point.

The goal of this paper is to show a few further reasons why Baumgarten marks a division between the so-called Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition and the Kantian transcendental revolution, and to emphasize that these reasons are rooted in psychology as it is conceived and treated in Baumgartens's *Metaphysica*.[1]

In the first part, we will focus on the origin of the distinction between the concepts of *I* (*ego*) and the soul as it is characterized in modern philosophy. This will enable us to assess how Baumgarten's conception of subjectivity tries to fill this gap by clarifying the ambivalence that had already emerged in Wolff's distinction between empirical and rational psychology.

This will require an analysis of the concept of the soul, which is directly linked to the faculties it can be endowed with. As a result, we will see that, although Baumgarten can still be included within the Wolffian tradition because of the *ordo expositionis* of his *Metaphysica*, this work nonetheless contains a deeper common thread that endows the system with a consistence we cannot find in its "schulphilosophische" predecessors.

Finally, we will try to demonstrate the effectiveness of Baumgarten's original approach by underlining his contribution to the solution of some thorny problems Kant faced in key moments of the foundation of criticism.

[1] Paragraph 1 and the first part of paragraph 2 of this essay are fundamentally a reformulation of a previous work of mine (cf. Lorini 2014).

1. Between the *I* and the soul

In modern tradition, Locke is considered the first to establish a sharp distinction between the soul as substance (*res cogitans*) and the person as consciousness (*ego cogitans*), and by doing so he proposes a possible solution to a difficult ambiguity of the Cartesian perspective.[2] Locke raises an apparently opposite difficulty at the same time, since he seems to leave no alternative for finding a link between these two terms.

Even Leibniz, whose monadological theory is not compatible with this scission, seems to endorse Locke's perspective by admitting the basic difference between the *I* and the soul. He obviously maintains the continuity between *simple monad*, *soul-monad* and *I*, but in the *Nouveaux Essais* – where he notoriously addresses Locke's positions – he states that the inherence and permanence of perceptions within the substance allow for determining the continuity of personal identity *also* through the continuity of the consciousness. This continuity, moreover, is not necessary for Leibniz to produce personal identity, in the same way as its discontinuity is not enough to destroy it.[3]

In modern scholarship, É. Balibar has questioned the difference between Locke and Leibniz on this point from a different perspective. He rejects Cassirer's opposition of the Leibnizian-Wolffian conception of the soul as *vis activa* to the Lockean one, which characterizes the soul as a simple passive faculty.[4] In Balibar's opinion, Locke's concept of *consciousness* represents the real foundation of rational psychology, which Wolff would have relegated to the empirical rank in order to leave space for his own rational psychology. This is clearly a bold statement because there are several Lockean passages that enable the traditional interpretation. At the same time, Cassirer's position surely needs to be questioned, but through a different strategy – namely, by noting that Wolff does not univocally define the soul as a *vis activa*.[5]

[2] Locke 1975: 337–341 (book II, chapter XXVII, §§ 13–17).

[3] Leibniz, *Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain*, *PS* 5: 220 (book II, chap. XXVII, § 9). About this reconstruction, cf. Perini 2005: 219–220.

[4] Locke 1998: 76. For the passage addressed by Balibar, cf. Cassirer 1998: 160–161.

[5] Cf. Casula 1979: 562–563. Casula underlines that in the *Deutsche Metaphysik* (hereafter *DM*), Wolff defined the substance as that which has in itself the source of its mutations (§ 114), and added that this source is called force [*Kraft*] (§ 115); in the *Ontologia,* he claims the substance

When we consider Wolff's extensive treatment of this topic, we face a tension between the soul conceived as a passive faculty, and consciousness as the foundation of personal identity – namely, of the *I*. Thus even if Wolff does not systematically pose this distinction, it seems to be consistent with Wolff's treatment, since in the *Psychologia rationalis* he defines *vires* as the capabilities of the soul to express itself "in continuo agendi conatu", and *facultates* as the passive expressions of the soul.[6] This reveals Wolff to be in Locke's debt, insofar as Wolff distances himself from Leibniz while still keeping his terminology. A good example is provided in Wolff's admission of some perceptions that are immediately endowed with consciousness,[7] even if the Leibnizian distinction between perception and apperception is still endorsed.[8] Furthermore, in the *Psychologia rationalis* the concept of *person*, and of the *I* as person, depends upon the continuity of consciousness and memory,[9] something Leibniz rejects in the *New Essays*. Yet Wolff did not know the *New Essays*, since they were published only in 1765, which was thirty-three years after his *Psychologia empirica* and thirty-one years after his *Psychologia rationalis* (and, by the way, also eleven years after Wolff's death). Regardless, this attests to the fact that Wolff's proximity to Locke is independent from any polemical aim against Leibniz (as his definition of *person* within the *DM* and the *PR* aptly attests to this).[10]

Thus, on the one hand, Wolff tries to keep himself in the Leibnizian track by settling an unsolvable reciprocal implication between empirical perception and rational apperception, which – as we will see – will raise an argumentative circularity. On the other hand, in keeping with his *logic of the faculties*, Wolff is aware of the different steps that characterize the elaboration of sensible data and therefore seems unable to provide that unitary image of the

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to be "subjectum, cui insunt essentialia et attributa eadem, dum modi successive variant" (§ 770). This *subjectum* can be associated with the Aristotelian definition of "ens, quod per se subsistit et sustinet accidentia" (§ 771).

[6] C. Wolff, *Psychologia rationalis* (hereafter *PR*), § 54.

[7] C. Wolff, *Psychologia empirica* (hereafter *PE*), e.g. § 436; *PR*, §§ 10–13. In addition, the primacy of consciousness is clearly stated since the beginning of the *DM*, cf. § 1.

[8] C. Wolff, *PE*, e.g. §§ 24, 48, 52; *PR*, §§ 26–27. On this point cf. Poggi 2007: 74–77.

[9] C. Wolff, *PR*, § 743.

[10] Cf. Wolff's definition of *person* within the *DM*, § 924 and *PR*, § 743. Cf. Poggi 2007: 92.

psychological subject, which is nonetheless still required by formal logic.[11]

In this sense, Wolff shares the difficulty that Locke denounces in the *Essay*: how is it possible to psychologically interpret the sense of the identity/continuity of self-consciousness without deriving its content from a sort of "substantial support"?[12] Obviously Locke and Wolff reach almost the same problem, but through different paths. Locke focuses on the analysis of the cognitive faculties of the subject, and in this sense he holds a perspective that would be defined today as exclusively epistemological. Instead, Wolff considers psychology in the wider context of the so-called *Metaphysica specialis*. As a result, he interprets the object of psychology as a *particular* [*specialis*] determination of that being, whose most general and undifferentiated expression is investigated by the so-called *Metaphysica generalis* – namely, ontology.

The problem of individuating a determined object for psychology is strictly linked with, and to a certain extent coincides with, the division of psychology into empirical psychology and rational psychology. The different perspectives from which these two branches investigate this object should not weaken the clearness and definiteness of it. The main obstacles to the possibility of univocally defining the object of psychology arise from the need to clarify its status with respect to sensibility. This object is indeed constitutively ambivalent: on the one hand, it is the object of self-consciousness within introspective self-analysis; on the other hand, it is simply an object among others in the world. This latter element points to the need for a clear definition of the value attributed to the knowledge gained on the sensible level.

It is at this stage that Baumgarten emerges as the promoter of a crucial turnaround.

2. Baumgarten's "discovery" of sensibility

The autonomy of the sensible dimension, from which aesthetics arises as a discipline in its own right, rests upon an implicit but unavoidable methodological assumption of a unitary conception of the finite subject.[13] This allows

[11] About this point Pozzo disagrees with Kuehn's underestimation of Wolff's actual psychological perspective in the treatment of logic, cf. Pozzo 2007: 51 and Kuehn 1997: here 230.

[12] Locke 1975: 340–341 (book II, chapter XXVII, § 16). Cf. also Perini 2005: 220.

[13] Cf. Kaehler 2008: 123–124.

the object of psychology to be defined as the soul, insofar as it is endowed with a *vis repraesentativa* geared toward the external world.[14] As in Wolff's system, the representations produced by this *vis* are based on perceptions, which can be clear or obscure, distinct or confused. Since Baumgarten takes these kinds of distinctions for granted in the *Metaphysica*, we need to refer to the *Acroasis logica* in order to find out the origin of his adherence to the Wolffian premises. In keeping with Wolff, Baumgarten explains here that the knowledge we have within thought consists in the perception accompanied by apperception, that is to say, by consciousness. Thus, since knowledge is equal to perception, perception without consciousness (namely, an obscure perception) does not raise any thought. The same goes for confused perceptions, which are targeted at several obscure determinations of the object.[15]

Therefore, consciousness is the distinctive mark of both the perceiving soul and the thinking subject, and moreover it reveals the identity between them. This is always carried out according to a Wolffian assumption: to think means to be conscious of something.[16]

At the same time, the soul has to count as the sufficient reason of the thoughts that are instantiated by it, just like the substance is the sufficient reason for its accidents.[17] Consequently, the *vis repraesentativa* of the soul constitutes the *ratio* of the *repraesentatum*. This *repraesentatum* coincides first of all with the part of the world that is closest to the soul – namely, the body[18] – which interacts with other physical beings within space and time, and nonetheless influences the representative and cognitive activity of the soul. As a result, the soul is defined as *vis repraesentativa universi* but *pro positu corporis sui*.[19] Baumgarten's agreement with Wolff here seems to be almost complete, but a closer inspection of his arguments reveals that his framework is significantly different at several points.

For example, one point consists in the Wolffian *perceptio totalis*,[20] under-

[14] A.G. Baumgarten, *Metaphysica* (hereafter *Met.*), §§ 506–507.

[15] A.G. Baumgarten, *Acroasis logica in Christianum L.B. de Wolff dictabat*, §§ 1–4.

[16] Wolff, *PE*, § 23.

[17] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 505, according to the principle presented at § 197.

[18] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 508.

[19] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 513; Wolff, *PR*, § 66.

[20] Wolff, *PE*, § 43.

stood by Baumgarten in a monadological sense as the totality of the representations *within* the soul.[21] This allows Baumgarten to systematically determine the *fundus animae* as the *complexum perceptionum obscurarum* based on the position of the body within the world. A further point deals with the demonstration of the actual existence of those beings, which are objects of psychology. In Wolff, this demonstration is logically consistent, but it implicitly supposes a cosmo-theological premise of the dependence of these substances on God as a creative cause. Baumgarten does not deny God's role within his system, but states the relationship between cosmology and psychology in quite a different way. We will concentrate here, however, on one particular point, specifically Wolff's employment of a generic *we* in order to designate the *subject* of the consciousness he analyses within the *Psychologia empirica*[22] in cases where Baumgarten uses the singular *I*.[23]

In order to understand the systematic origin of Wolff's choice, we once again need to delve into the distinction between his empirical and rational psychology, respectively, with regard to *consciousness* and the *soul*.[24] The best reference point for this topic is represented in §193 of the *Deutsche Metaphysik*, which is even clearer than the corresponding §20 of the *Psychologia empirica*. The soul and consciousness do not coincide – warns Wolff – because *within* the soul there is *also* something of which we cannot immediately be conscious, which can be known not through experience but through syllogisms. Thus, the primacy of the empirical element, of the direct experience of the singular *I*, seems to be weakened by the necessary reference to a broader logical *ratio*. Thereby – as it has been suggested by C. A. Corr – on the one hand, empirical psychology has the task of verifying the conclusions of rational psychology within experience;[25] but, on the other hand, these conclusions cannot be acquired unless the demonstrative process starts from the empirical dimension.[26]

[21] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 514.

[22] Wolff, *PE*, §§ 24–26.

[23] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 504.

[24] Cf. Euler 2004: 21–24; Paccioni 2004: 96.

[25] Cf. Corr 1975: 199–200.

[26] About the main issues of the distinction between the two psychologies, cf. École 1966: 589–617; Id. 1969: 499–531. On the circularity of the demonstrative relationships between

Such a paradoxical situation rests fundamentally upon Wolff's peculiar concept of *experience*, which implies that the empirical and rational approaches cannot be separated. They must, instead, always be distinct and connected, because empirical psychology has evidence but lacks demonstrative character, whereas the contrary holds for rational psychology.[27] However, despite the undeniable relevance that Wolff attributes to empirical data on the methodological plane (as the beginning of the cognitive process),[28] this circularity demonstrates that the rationalistic formalism is still irreducible – and in some cases it is dominant.[29]

Baumgarten's distinction between empirical and rational psychology is sharper than Wolff's, but this cannot be explained merely through the different perspectives adopted by the two authors in the domain of empirical psychology: Wolff's *we* against Baumgarten's *I*. In any case, as it has been already defended (for instance, by C. Dyck), Baumgarten's empirical psychology can be considered Wolffian "in its method and purpose".[30] This can be easily confirmed by noting that even Baumgarten's rational psychology cannot avoid relying on the observations and consequent definitions stated by empirical psychology. Despite their theoretical separation, the continuity between the two branches of Baumgarten's psychology can be defended using robust textual evidence: for instance, in the section of the *Metaphysica* devoted to the *Psychologia rationalis* Baumgarten contends that:

> Just as § 752 proved that sensation, etc., is in every human soul, the same can be shown regarding the rest of the actions of the soul that are to be discovered in it through experience, and specified through empirical psychology (§ 576 ff.).[31]

Thus the universality of reason cannot be omitted even on the sensible plane. This is to say that only insofar as the empirical results about *my* soul can be extended to the human soul in general, can rational psychology demonstrate

them, cf. École 1968: 7; Euler 2004: 19–24, 30, 49; Arnauld 2004: 64–67; Piselli 1988: 40–41.

[27] Cf. Paccioni 2004: 96.

[28] Cf. École 1990: I, 78; Arnauld 2004: 62; Id. 2002: 35–46.

[29] Cf. Euler 2004: 33.

[30] Dyck 2014: 46.

[31] Baumgarten, *Met*, §753.

the soul to be necessarily a spirit, an understanding, in other words, a person.[32]

It is not by chance that Wolff employs the term *ego* as corresponding exactly to the concept of *person*. He does so, moreover, in his *Psychologia rationalis*,[33] in a section devoted to "the origin of the soul", "its relationship with the body" and "its immortality" – a section which, nonetheless, does not deal with the *definition* of the soul. Yet this does not sound surprising, since here the object of the analysis is represented by consciousness, while when treating the soul – that is, in the *Psychologia empirica* – he employs the plural.

It is at this point that the distinction between Baumgarten's singular and Wolff's plural perspective in the context of empirical psychology acquires a strongly epistemological connotation. Indeed, we can now see the difference in the approach to rational psychology that lurks behind the singular or the plural perspectives that are adopted by empirical psychology. The more abstract perspective of rational psychology, though shared by both Wolff and Baumgarten, is reached by the former through a mere change of perspective, whereas the latter carries out a systematic generalization of the *I*-soul's experience described in empirical psychology.

Baumgarten's employment of the *I* in the context of the *Psychologia empirica* can be regarded as attesting to his deeper concern with the knowing subject in sensible experience. This does not imply a weakening of the universality of reason in any way. Reason has here, however, a peculiar way of expression, which is totally absent in Wolff.

Baumgarten's concept of experience, even if apparently similar to Wolff's, is much more focused on the possibility of discovering a form of rationality that is peculiarly detectable from the sensible experience of the singular *I*: "I think [*cogito*] about my present state. Therefore, I represent my present state, i.e. I sense [*sentio*]".[34]

In a different way, since even Wolff's concept of perception in the *Psychologia empirica* still relies on attention,[35] Wolff partially underpins the possibility of experience on purely rational principles; Baumgarten, in contrast, places his treatment of the "Sensus" soon after the exposition of the

[32] Cf. Dyck 2014: 45–46.

[33] Wolff, *PR*, § 743 et supra.

[34] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 534.

[35] Wolff, *PE*, §§ 264–265, 267; *PR*, §§ 23–25, 372–374.

inferior cognitive faculty as an independent source of the "Scientia sensitive cognoscendi et proponendi", which in the previous section he had just defined as *Aesthetics*.[36]

While Baumgarten needs to rely on the singular empirical *I* to qualify his concept of soul, Wolff – as we have seen – is mainly concerned with the relationship between the soul and consciousness, and does not seem to be interested in describing the knowledge that the soul, as a singular unit, can acquire. He provides evidence for this in his indifferent use of the words *soul* or *mind* to designate the object of his empirical psychology: "This thing [*Ens*] that in us is conscious of itself and of other things [*res*] is called *Soul*. It is often called also *Human soul*, equally *Mind*, *Human mind*".[37]

Moreover, in the *Psychologia rationalis*, Wolff goes a step further and identifies *mens* and *intellectus*: "The first operation of the understanding [*intellectus*], or mind [*mens*] does not exceed the force of representing the universe, as it [the force] is given within the soul [*anima*] (§392)".[38]

Baumgarten, instead, employs *mens* to define *understanding* as the *superior cognitive faculty* of the soul, and his treatment of this is also, and significantly so, placed in his *Psychologia empirica*.[39]

It is, therefore, not surprising that Baumgarten expands the chapter of his *Metaphysica* devoted to empirical psychology in several ways that cannot be found in Wolff.[40] The nature of the *I* and its relationship with the body are indeed the proper topics of empirical psychology,[41] and even while addressing the first section of rational psychology that concerns the nature of the soul, Baumgarten begins with a definition of the *anima humana* as that "soul which is in the closest interaction [*commercium*] with the human body".[42] Thus, also in this purely rational context, the basis of the treatment is empirical and refers to points that had been dealt with within *Ontology* and *Cosmology*. The goal is to repeat, from a purely rational perspective, what

[36] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 533.

[37] Wolff, *PE*, § 20.

[38] Wolff, *PR*, § 393.

[39] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 624.

[40] Cf. Fugate-Hymers 2013: 21.

[41] Baumgarten, *Met*, §§ 505–513.

[42] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 740.

had already been gained in the empirical field – namely, that "anima *humana* est vis repraesentativa universi pro positu corporis *humani* in eodem".[43]

The original feature of Baumgarten's approach to psychology consists in claiming the *peculiar* rationality of empirical knowledge. Once the subjective self-consciousness has been recognized to be crucial, *perception*, *representation* and *knowledge* can be considered equivalent – namely, as expressions of rationality. Of course empirical psychology remains topical, but at the same time the small number of paragraphs Baumgarten devotes to rational psychology (especially in comparison with Wolff) does not imply the systematic weakening of this latter.[44] It is precisely by virtue of the systematic link between the two branches of psychology described above that empirical psychology can reach its autonomy.

3. Different levels of influence on Kant

The aforementioned texts allow us to recognize both a continuity between empirical and rational psychology in Baumgarten, and a Wolffian influence on the existence of a systematic relationship between the two. However, there is a further reason not to overlook Baumgarten's choice to conceive of the soul as *I* and not as *we* in the *Psychologia empirica*. This choice represents a fruitful, though sometimes negative, approach to understand the Kant of the middle and late 1770s – a period that is, in many respects, crucial for the development of Kant's critical thought.

In the annotations to the lectures on metaphysics from the mid-1770s (the so-called *Metaphysik* L_1), it is in virtue of following Baumgarten that Kant identifies the object of empirical psychology with the *I* as *human being* – as opposed to the *I* as *intelligence,* which is the object of rational psychology.[45] Although Kant, in these lectures, essentially does not define the soul as an object of empirical psychology, there is at least one place where he cannot avoid doing so. In the *Introductory Concepts* of *Psychology*, where Kant explains the difference between empirical and rational psychology, we read:

[43] Baumgarten, *Met*, § 741 (emphasis added).

[44] Cf. Casula 1979: 167, who on this point partially disagrees with Schwaiger 2011: 37–38.

[45] Kant, *Metaphysik* L_1, AA 28: 224, trans. pp. 44–45.

> As *soul*, I am determined by the body, and stand with it in interaction. As *intelligence*, I am at no location, for location is a relation at outer intuition, but as intelligence I am not an outer object which can be determined with respect to relation.[46]

It is clear that this juxtaposition is a refined version of what Kant had mentioned a few lines earlier – namely, that between the *I* as *human being* and the *I* as *intelligence*. This latter distinction was employed to define the different objects of empirical and rational psychology respectively; but between the former and the latter distinction, Kant states that "this intelligence, which is connected with the body and constitutes a human being, is called *soul*".[47] Therefore, we can actually detect one point where Kant explicitly admits that the soul is the object of empirical psychology, precisely insofar as it is connected with the body and constitutes the human being. Moreover, at the end of the section on empirical psychology and when considering the *Interaction of the soul with the body*, Kant frequently refers to the *soul* in the context of an investigation that pertains to empirical psychology. This provides even more evidence that any consideration of the soul in the context of rational psychology necessarily relies on the soul as a concept of experience in the way it is treated in empirical psychology.

It is well-known that the particular characterization of the concept of experience in Kant is one of the pillars of his Copernican Revolution. Therefore, the possibility of attributing the conditions of possibility of the individual subject's experience to the universality of reason has doubtlessly exerted a meaningful influence on the elaboration of the crucial concept of "transcendental". This concept – which presumably comes to its most refined expression precisely at the end of the 1770s – could, *mutatis mutandis*, owe something to the conceptual "generalization" Baumgarten employs in the step from the empirical to the rational dimension of psychology.

This debate nevertheless has also influenced Kant in a negative sense. The peculiarity of Baumgarten's reception of the relationship Wolff determined between empirical and rational psychology seems to have contributed to Kant making some methodological corrections – which possibly gave

[46] Kant, *Metaphysik L_1*, AA 28: 225, trans. p. 45.

[47] Kant, *Metaphysik L_1*, AA 28: 224, trans. p. 45.

rise to the well-known developments of the critical period.

On the one hand, Baumgarten's treatment of psychology aims to contrast the dualism between *I* and the soul by showing how these two terms coincide, and this attempt relies on the possibility of having a direct experience of the soul on the empirical plane. On the other hand, Kant embraces the necessity of going beyond the *I*-soul dualism within psychology, but the direction in which he carries out this supersession opposes Baumgarten's direction. Even though in the mid-1770s Kant still thinks a direct experiential access to the soul as intelligence is possible, in his critical turn he considers this possibility to be untenable. Kant, in turn, comes to argue that any effort to grasp the substantial, simple and personal nature of the thinking *I* is an illusion, which has to be replaced by the logical-transcendental function of the *I think*.

It is true that a rigorous historian of philosophy should read any text by an author as though it were the author's last – that is, in order not to be influenced by the later developments of the author's thought. Yet, in this particular case, we have no printed works by Kant between 1770 and 1781, and thus his letters, private notes and lecture notes are the only instruments at our disposal. Nevertheless, since the lectures comment on the thesis of an author, like Baumgarten, who belongs to a consolidated tradition in Germany, we can legitimately maintain that we are not falling prey to chronological misinterpretations. By commenting on Kant's lectures of the mid and late 1770s, we are able to detect the possible methodological premises of a fundamental turning point, which calls for a synergy of careful historical study and theoretical criticism.

The extent Kant was influenced by the debate on the status of subjectivity in the German tradition immediately preceding him allows us to claim that without Baumgarten's reassessment of psychology, Kant's positive path to the transcendental conditions of experience, as well as his negative path to the *Paralogisms,* could have been different, and maybe harder.

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MEMORY, *JUDICIUM DISCRETIVUM* AND WIT IN KANT'S LECTURES ON ANTHROPOLOGY

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Abstract
The topic of memory is regularly dealt with by Kant in his Lectures on Anthropology, and is seen by the philosopher not only as a key element in the description of the I's imaginative process, but also as an aesthetic-anthropological category in its own right. As such – that is, as an inferior faculty of the spirit –, memory, as well as imagination, fantasy or wit play an important part in the fulfilment of Kant's greater intention, namely, to reconfigure each of these faculties per se and between themselves and to create harmony between inferior and superior faculties, thereby ensuring a sane human spirit. The aim of the following article is to assess the extent to which Kant succeeds in doing this; that is, to analyze Kant's view of memory in relation to other analogous faculties, to ascertain how revolutionary this view is and whether it separates Kant's opinion from the one of his predecessors', and finally, to see how far Kant's division of the topic in rational, judicious and ingenious memory contributes to this goal.

Keywords
Kant, memory, anthropology, imagination.

1.

Kant deals with the topic of memory under the general title – "Vom Gedächtnis"; and just as with other faculties of the soul, inferior or superior, the philosopher approaches this topic also implicitly in other sections devoted to these very faculties, specially, and quite unsurprisingly so, the ones of the faculty of imagination – proof of the proximity among all faculties, and the intimate cooperation between the two latter.

Hence, it is no surprise that in the *Lectures*, as in the *Anthropology* (1798), *memory*, and with it the *faculty of imagination*, namely, the pair that went hand in hand throughout the modern history of anthropology, are often dealt with jointly, and thus form a nuclear core in the question. Just as many previous authors, Kant too thought that between these two inferior faculties there had to be some special relation, for their procedure is not only similar, but simultaneous, and therefore mistakable; and since within Kant's anthropology *inferior faculties does not mean exactly... inferior faculties*, then from their akin relation, from their position in relation to one another in the field of imaginative faculties, greatly depended the ultimate position of the remaining faculties, and hence the general scope of the problem.

Now, considered *in itself*, Kant's topic of memory does not differ greatly from authors who had shaped the concept in light of their anthropologies. In Kant, as in Platner, memory, the "faculty of remembering" (AA 25.1: 87) is, as is fantasy, a faculty of reimagination, namely, "the faculty to recall past representations in consciousness, and is a recognition of our representations and our previous knowledge" (AA 25.2: 974) (for "Our present time is filled with images from the past, and this is the only means to represent a connection between thoughts" (AA 25.1: 76).

But considered *in its connection with fantasy and the faculty of imagination*, the case is not the same.

Hence, according to Platner, *memory and fantasy* (or imagination) are faculties of reimagination, but both differ inasmuch as imagination produces representations devoid of conviction – that is, it reimagines erroneously, for it is excessive and thwarts the original –, and hence its separation from the understanding; whereas the representations of memory are endowed with free will, and hence conviction and certainty, and confine with the understanding. But, although with necessary similarities, *Kant conceives this problem quite differently*. For, to Kant, memory and fantasy are also faculties of reimagination; and they differ inasmuch as fantasy is not "a repeated imagination (Einbildung)" (AA 25.1: 78), as is memory, rather "a faculty to produce objects, and to describe and form in the spirit, through a special force, that which falls in the senses" (id.: 511): namely, "facultas informandi impressiones sensuum" (ibid.). Now, that *transformation of objects*, and the *special force* with which fantasy operates it, precisely that is for Platner the cause

of its unreliability, and Kant himself often alerts for the dangers of fantasy – but, at the same time, one must not forget that memory resides in fantasy, and not the other way around; for fantasy may not always be memory, but memory – and Platner would not deny this – is always fantasy, as *Einbildung* (that is, fantasy precedes and is also simultaneous to memory; memory is just simultaneous to fantasy). And hence, once could say that Kant does consider that fantasy differs from memory; but since memory is altogether fantasy – though with the latter's restriction –, then one may conclude that Kant ascribes fantasy as *beneficial*, though dangerous, a function which Planer saw as completely *harmful*; namely, that *fantasy is indeed the essential mortar of memory*: on the one hand, upon *remembering*, as the faculty which informs memory, as well as the other faculties, of the impression of external senses – which, so to say, re-forms those representations, and brings them to light as memories; on the other hand, upon the formation of the *remembrance* as such; for memory is essentially imagination (*Einbildung*), and precisely that is fantasy!; and hence, both must have truth, as well as inventiveness; or, to use Platner's own terms, both must have conviction, which comes from memory, and uncertainty, which comes from fantasy – *but both must have one and the other*, for that is specific of remembrance, which can never reenact the impression as it was originally conveyed. That is why Kant concludes: fantasy is an "active force of spontaneous images" (AA 25.1: 87), whereas memory is the "faculty to reproduce arbitrary representations that we had" (id.); on the one hand, thus ascribing fantasy not a role of mere deception, but a new, both communicative and inventive function, which is to be received and interpreted, accepted yet scrutinized by memory; on the other hand, ascribing memory no longer the role of pure certainty and truth, no longer a role as faculty intimate of the understanding, but a new, more ductile function, and thus only in indirect contact with the understanding.

Now this first level of reciprocal reformulation between memory and fantasy is very important. But its reach cannot end here, and it itself, as well as the fundamental shift it proposes, have *another reason of being* – namely, one related to *the role the faculty of imagination assumes in Kant's new configuration of the problem*, and which will definitively change the cast of the inferior reimaginative faculties. Namely, if there is a reason why Kant ascribes fantasy new functions as the *creative informer of memory*; and if there

is a reason why memory *has to* accept such data, and *has to* refrain them, so that no vain deliria, rather true and meaningful cognitions are conveyed to the superior faculties of the soul, it is because to Kant, unlike Platner, Baumgarten and many other anthropologists, *imagination is different from memory, and hence also from memory, and because, despite necessary similarities between the latter, the faculty of imagination has to assume a new, more central role in the framework of the imaginative faculties*. Hence, what was previously designated simply as *imagination*, and thus connoted with mere imagination (*Einbildung*) – which, in turn, would render *phantasia* a mere synonym of *imaginatio* – that (the faculties of reimagination) would have to carry on being ascribed to the faculty of imagination. For imagination, fiction, that essential power of the faculty of imagination (*Einbildungskraft*), is reflected on fantasy and on memory; that is, *the faculty of imagination acts upon the latter, and hence there is imagination in them*. But although the faculty of imagination extends to the other reimaginative and preimaginative faculties, it is also *itself*, that is, though constantly linked, it is also separated from the latter; and hence, one thing is the imagination (*Einbildung*) with which fantasy labors, reforms and transforms with unique vigour, and from whence arises memory – reimaginative work –, another one, says Kant, is the imagination which has nothing to do with the object, rather dissociates itself from it, and hence does not necessarily give, rather receives the representations of fantasy, under the scrutiny of memory, from the reimaginative faculties: "Imagination (*Einbildung*), independent from all sensible intuition, is designated as imagination (*Imagination*)" (AA 25.1: 78)

In a word, how to conceive the new disposition of the imaginative faculties proposed by Kant? *Fantasy*, and its aforementioned double work as informer and creator of data, now emerge as remote, yet real action of the faculty of imagination – after all, fantasy is imaginative by nature, and the faculty of imagination is also fanciful in its action (fantasy, one could say, is imagination under the free will of memory). *Memory*, and its aforementioned double task to accept, and yet also to scrutinize, the products of fantasy, and hence to deem what is effectively memory, or mere fiction, now emerges as an antechamber for the action of the faculty of imagination in its relation to the understanding (memory, one could say, is what truly separates fantasy and the faculty of imagination, and ascribes them their due places in the

equation). And finally, the *faculty of imagination emerges as cause, as well as product of fantasy and memory*; that is, in a word, the faculty of imagination is in this scheme total; and hence, it emancipates from fantasy and memory, where it is mere imagination (*Einbildung*), but since this emancipation is not complete, it also acquires among the latter a mediating, and at the same time also distinctive and regulating function, and becomes a faculty no doubt central, and autonomous, though never so autonomous that this autonomy is not based on its capacity to remember, and its power of foresight. And why is this so? Because, according to Kant, the faculty of imagination, the *Imagination*, does not just deal with the object (whereby it is reproductive); it deals primarily with the latter's image (whereby it is also productive); and by doing this, and dealing with the joint product of fantasy and memory, it creates specific automatisms, it inhabits its own, unique world, where past, present and future singularly merge.

Hence we ask: in view of the new relation fantasy-memory, and the new position of the faculty of imagination before the latter, what is to be said about the *quality* and the *position* of memory in this context? Three considerations spring to mind:

Firstly, the fact that, in this alignment, *the position of memory is significantly altered*; namely, memory is no longer the faculty of conviction (Platner), or of faithfulness (Hume), and hence the faculty which deals directly with the understanding, and moves the soul – all in detriment of the faculty of imagination. Instead, *memory, faculty of reimagination, is ascribed a new double role between fantasy and imagination, according to which it not only has to halt fantasy and protect the faculty of imagination, and ultimately the understanding, but also not to do this in such a way that it does not silence fantasy, which also contains truth, and in such a way that the latter might not be realized in the faculty of imagination, thus also benefiting the rational faculties*.

Secondly, the fact that repositioning does not mean lessening the role of memory. Quite conversely, beyond the degrees, expressions, pathologies or many a prowess of memory, which are here of little matter, it is important to underscore that according to Kant *the concept of memory is a hybrid concept*; for if memory is no doubt "repetition of intuitions, that is, of images which we did on occasion of things" (AA 25.1: 76), however that repetition is unavoidably composed both *by fantasy, by freedom* – which is the fanciful

dimension of imagination – and *free will*, which memory actively forces upon the imagination, but which conversely is tacitly imposed to memory by the faculty of imagination, which does not deal with senseless representations, and the understanding, which deals only with truth. That is, without memory, fantasy would forever err, and the faculty of imagination would receive but deception, which in turn the understanding would reject, thus increasingly hardening its actions. And hence, among faculties, *memory is reserved a singular role: a rigorous, yet creative; a judicious, yet inventive one*. For it is a lofty power of the spirit; the ground of all sciences, and vital vehicle of the arts; and thus, not in its subordination, but in its new importance, that Kant would understand the concept.

Thirdly, the fact that, being in such intimate and important connection with fantasy and faculty of imagination, *the aforementioned hybridity of memory surely have repercussions in various sub-redispositions of the superior and inferior faculties of the soul*, amid the fundamental disposition of the imaginative I. For, in a word, we are dealing here with a unique and fundamental disposition, the one of the imaginative I; and in this general disposition, all faculties must have a role, certainly a non-disruptive one, if there is to be harmony among them. But even amid this new general role of memory there may be other variations, some of a more, others of a less rational nature, of the same procedure, thus resulting in different effects within the one and same image of memory as a reimaginative faculty; and so, if after the shift in its position, memory still holds great importance for the other faculties, to the extent that *memory is reproductive imagination* (cf. AA 25.2: 1272), and *between memory and imagination there differs but an act* (cf. id.: 974), and hence *memory is a superior force of the spirit* (id.: 756), than this means, on the one hand, *that the relation memory-faculty of imagination, and memory-remaining faculties, cannot be considered as impervious to exception, that is, rigid*; on the other hand, *that the whole process of repositioning memory cannot be devoid of an ulterior aim, which will surely unveil the true status of the topic of memory in Kant*.

2.

In attempting to approach the topic of memory, Kant deems it not a storehouse, or a *receptaculum*, as other authors do, but as a map in which most places are obscured, that is, *forgotten*, and just few are lit: namely, a geographic

chart of regions or representations either already unraveled but abandoned, or yet to unravel, which, as a destiny, await for the human spirit to gradually (re-)perceive, and hence illuminate them.

That is, there is not only the *possibility* (referring to human, individual circumstances), but also the *necessity* (referring to a universal destination of the human being) to illuminate such forgotten, or unknown representations which now lay under "rubble and dust" (AA 25.1: 311) in the human spirit; and, if so, this must occur in the terms in which Kant previously set memory, namely, as *a sensible faculty in an indirect relation with the soul*: a faculty which has to balance its levels of free will and freedom, rationality and inventiveness, according to the different relations which memory forges with fantasy and faculty of imagination, and the latter with the superior faculties of the soul.

This position, as well as its modalities, is the only sub-topic which Kant deems noteworthy in the *Lectures*, the *Annotations* and the *Anthropology* of 1798. According to him, there are *three*: *a mechanical memorization and/or remembrance,* "Mechanisches Memoriren"*; an ingenious one,* "Ingeniöses Memoriren"*, and a judicious one,* "Iudiciöses Memoriren" (AA 756, 1463 etc.): *three kinds of memory, that is, three different angles of Kant's general view on memory, and hence three different ways of acting, through images, upon the human soul.*

Now, with regard to *mechanical memory*, it occurs "through multiple repetition of a thing" (AA 25.2: 1463), and through it "if things are to occur to us; then they must arise in the same order in which we memorized them" (id.). Born out of repetition, of natural sequences, mechanical memory reappears in like measure of the expectation of the object; for it is from this absence of feeling between apprehension and remembrance that mechanical memory draws its strength. To use the previous metaphor, it is *the illumination of regions already illuminated*, a rational repetition of preserved representations, surely in a dimmer light. For it deals no more than necessary with fantasy – by casting her aside –, and the faculty of imagination – which it nearly silences –, and thus, embodies a specific, rather *unnatural* kind of memory, curiously akin to that of Platner or Hume, but which either *falls short*, or goes beyond Kant's ideal view of memory: it *falls short* because this memory lacked the elasticity required to harmonize with the remaining inferior

faculties – *it is tasteless, and hence non-aesthetic*; and it *goes beyond* because, due to this lack of elasticity and feeling, mechanical memory, its natural mechanicity and certainty, rather claims to be able to forfeit that harmonization, and contact directly with the superior faculties of the soul, which no doubt has the advantage of not deceiving the soul, but does not provide it with anything new either. In a word, *mechanical memory, though taken as the nearest to the soul, is in fact the furthest from it*; and even though it is useful and necessary, it cannot be seen as the foundation for a new status of memory.

As to *ingenious memory*, it is a method which resorts to "certain representations, through association with adjacent representations which as such (for the understanding) have no affinity between themselves" (AA 7: 82); that is, ingenious memory "consists of a certain game of the wit" (AA 25.2: 1463). And why is this? Because ingenious memory is born from man's natural tendency to associate parallel representations, some closer and more linear, others further apart and more singular, to objects; and even though all these representations remain concealed during their conservation, upon their remembrance, a torrent of neighboring, or akin images (see AA 15.2: 148) rushes back to the soul, and through wit, which works on a thin line between rational and irrational, overwhelms the understanding. Now this supersession stands for Kant's well-known double position on wit, on genius, in a word, on the effect of poetry in general: that, *on the one hand*, these are well extremely beneficial for the soul, because by conquering the opposition of the faculty of judgment, and flooding the understanding with new and unheard of representations – in a word, by "making noise in the brain" (AA 25.1: 312) – these faculties simultaneously promote the advancement of both the arts and rational sciences; but, *on the other hand* – and despite such advantages – wit, as an extreme poetical effect, as a manifestation of genius, is always on the verge of falling into excess, even resulting in pathologies, and thereby hurting the understanding; all the more because although it is endowed with taste, it is nonetheless exacerbated, and finally robs the understanding of any taste. And hence, no doubt memory is benefited, if not enhanced in its remembrance, from wit – for in revolving representations, several unexpected or even unknown ones arise; and that is surely good. But in wit, due to a "leges Phantasiae brutae" (AA 25.1: 91), there often occurs an "unruly procedure of the faculty of imagination in pairing that which cannot

belong under one and the same concept" (AA 7: 82), which renders wit oppressive to memory – as if, through ingenious memory, certain, previously unknown regions in the map of representations were illuminated, but this could not happen without great harm for the traveler.

In a word, this kind of memory is *the direct opposite of the latter*, and hence it too falls short and yet is beyond Kant's view of ideal memory; for if it is factual that ingenious memory has, even in excess, the flexibility necessary to put into contact the remaining faculties of the soul, however its cognitions are not always certain, rather they are excessive and often constrain the understanding: "for wit is very volatile, and this is also very harmful to the faculty of judgment" (AA 25.2: 1463); and hence, ingenious memory, though it is taken as the furthest from the soul, is however *the nearest from it – all too near, even* – and so it too cannot be seen as the foundation for a new status of memory.

Finally, as to the *third* kind of memory, *judicious memory*, one expects that it would find its place between the other two, and that, given its connection to the *iudicium discretivum*, it would present itself as an harmonization between the latter; that is, in a word, that it completed the palette of the kinds of memory, thus filling a void. *Such is the case*. For if in mechanical memory there is certainty, and in ingenious memory there is uncertainty, in judicious memory there is between representations a "natural connection" (AA 25.2: 757): because, unlike the others, judicious memory "lies upon the association of representations, through the similitude of images, through the familiarity of representations and through the affinity between cause and consequence" (AA 25.2: 1463).

However, it is my opinion that Kant's colocation of judicious memory as such has its ground in a deeper plane of this question. Hence, the *natural connection* here undertaken by judicious memory is, first and foremost, a connection between a recorded image and a reactivated image; and if it is natural, that is because it is neither merely rational nor merely ingenious, rather the image is kept and resurfaces with an exact, for *natural*, degree of *deixis*, no more, no less than the necessary in order for it to be adopted by the faculty of imagination, and subsequently condoned by the understanding. But natural connection means neither natural memory, nor a natural image resulting from memory. No; indeed, *images so reactivated are for Kant all but*

natural, and that because they do not represent a peaceful junction of the other two memories. Quite on the contrary, judicious memory is the expression of a *conflict*, namely, the need to have to replicate, in memorization, and in remembrance themselves, the best of two worlds, the one of rationality and the one of inventiveness, while casting aside the worst of both these worlds. But these two things – *they are doubly contrary*! And hence, judicious memory cannot deem itself independent from the other two memories, rather it must conciliate in itself, and quite singularly so, the rigidity of the first and the flexibility of the second; but also the certainty of mechanical memory, and the uncertainty of ingenious memory, so that the representations which memory apprehends, preserves and remembers, contain, in the eyes of the understanding, something at once certain and uncertain, beneficial and disadvantageous. This explains, on the one hand, why according to Kant memory does not confine directly with the understanding (which would be the case in rational memory), nor is it totally separated from it (which would be the case in ingenious memory), rather the latter are mediated by the faculty of imagination, which at the same time approximates and separates memory from the understanding – and which explains, on the other hand, the reason of being for this judicious memory; for it is judicious memory which offers itself, in this complex and hybrid disposition, through the faculty of imagination, to the judgment of the understanding.

Now, this means two things: *firstly*, that the images of judicious memory are indeed natural, natural meaning however a complex composition between rational and creative, unconsciously undertaken by the human soul, which results in images at once comfortable and uncomfortable for the understanding – that is, worthy to be scrutinized by the understanding; *secondly, and most importantly, that, by so acting, judicious memory summons, and definitively consolidates, the shift in the topology of the faculties of the soul, as proposed previously by Kant*. For here, neither reason nor fantasy govern, and the very measurement of strength between imagination and memory no longer makes sense; in judicious memory, the important is the degree of connection between memory and understanding: and this is here neither too intimate, nor too estranged; but nor is it natural as such, rather it oscillates somewhere between the other two, not in them, but between them, *now nearer, now further apart from the understanding* – that is, now controlling, but

not completely silencing fantasy, and providing the imagination with images which directly connect it with the understanding; now unbridling freeing, but not entirely letting loose of fantasy, and providing the faculty of imagination with images which connect it only indirectly with the understanding – and both, designates Kant as *the free will of memory*, which is felt both directly and indirectly by the faculty of imagination and the understanding, and which institutes the harmony sought by Kant. And hence, it is precisely in this hybrid, for simultaneously triple position of judicious memory that Kant founds the triple sub-position, and also the one and only general position of memory within the framework of the faculties of the soul: judicious memory which, one could say, does not rediscover conquered regions, nor does it dare to discover forbidden ones, rather, by discovering new representations, displays them in the eyes of the spirit under a correct light, thereby submitting to the latter's consideration whether the discovery is worthy to be kept illuminated, or should once again be cast into darkness.

Finally, we may conclude that Kant repositions memory in the context of man's imaginative process by denying it direct contact with the understanding where it is not hand in hand with the faculty of imagination – which is the case with judicious memory. But *Kant does not restrict the status of memory*, but neither does he seek the opposite of this only to heighten judicious memory. For rational memory lays the foundations of reason, and ingenious memory lays the foundations of wit, even of genius – and that is indeed relevant; but judicious memory is at the basis of *a sound use of the faculty of imagination – productive imagination* – the very same which, when taken to the extreme of its double contention between rationality and inventiveness, does not merely strive to have its representations accepted by the understanding, rather results in the healthiest productions of wit, genius and ultimately poetry – which greatly promote the understanding and reason –, which surely raises judicious memory above memories, and memory above other faculties. For judicious memory, so says Kant, is the only one which is *naturally beautiful*, and hence the only one which is *genuinely aesthetic*: "Judicious memory is the most beautiful, for in it one always knows what one can use" (AA 25.2: 1463). And hence, *in the case of judicious memory, Kant rather proposes something different*: that this kind of memory, and its representations, are naturally beautiful – and that only through this beauty, and

this singular naturalness, is there total proportion between faculties, and a subsequent natural harmonization between human body and soul; and so, through this new exposition of the palette of human memories, and certainly through judicious memory, one could conclude that Kant rather *ennobles* the status of memory among the inferior faculties, not only placing it in its due position, but rendering heterogeneous this very position according to the kind of memory, and the type of relation it forges between faculties; in a word, *elevating it to a status which it had not yet had among the categories of former anthropologies*.

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THE CONCEPT OF ANXIETY AND KANT

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Abstract
In this paper, I will outline the beginnings of Kierkegaard's or Haufniensis' solution to a problem faced by Kant – the problem of how it is possible freely to do wrong. Kant has difficulty, as many have suggested, explaining the possibility of freely doing wrong, for he frequently argues that freedom and the moral law reciprocally imply one another (See Alison Assiter, "Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil", *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement,* Volume 72 / July 2013, 275–296, for some discussion of attempts to solve this problem for Kant). I will suggest that Kierkegaard, or Haufniensis, in *The Concept of Anxiety* offers an approach to freedom that does not lead to Kant's problem but that maintains Kant's conception of freedom.
The Concept of Anxiety displays the influence of Schelling. In CA, Haufniensis refers to Schelling a number of times. I would like to look, in this paper, at CA and the story of Adam and Eve.

Keywords
Freedom, evil, Kant, Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*

In this paper, I will outline the beginnings of Kierkegaard's or Haufniensis' solution to a problem faced by Kant – the problem of how it is possible freely to do wrong.

Kant has difficulty, as many have suggested,[1] explaining the possibility of freely doing wrong, for he frequently argues that freedom and the

[1] See, for three examples as well as for references to others, Alison Assiter, *Kierkegaard, Kant and Metaphors of Birth,* London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015, Michelle Kosch, *Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling and Kierkegaard,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, and also Paul Guyer, *Kant,* Oxford: Routledge, 2006, 225–226. For an ingenious attempt to solve Kant's problem from a Kantian perspective, see Seiriol Morgan, "The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity's Radical Evil in Kant's Religion", *Philosophical Review* 114, no. 1 (January 2005).

moral law reciprocally imply one another.[2] He also has difficulty providing an account of the origin of freedom.[3] For Kant in the CPR, freedom consists in a different kind of causation from that which is operative in the rest of the natural world. Kant offers a very strong conception of freedom. It is an "absolute spontaneity" which "begins of itself".[4] Freedom, at least on some readings of Kant on the subject, is a characteristic of the noumenal self which is outside time.

I will suggest that Kierkegaard, or Haufniensis, in *The Concept of Anxiety,* offers an approach to freedom that does not lead to Kant's problem but that maintains Kant's strong and libertarian conception of freedom.

The Concept of Anxiety (CA) displays the influence of Schelling, particularly his *Freiheitsschrift*. In this text, Haufniensis refers to Schelling a number of times. Kierkegaard, or Haufniensis, I believe, takes from Schelling a conception of the natural world that differs profoundly from that of Kant. Schelling does not separate nature from freedom. Summarising a complex theory, his view is that humans form part of a living and active nature.[5] Causation, in the natural world, is understood by him in a teleological fashion that is similar to that offered by Kant in his third *Critique*.[6] However, for Schelling, organic "things" like trees or flowers really are comprised of powers. Indeed, the whole world is made up of powers that manifest themselves in objects. Instead of viewing teleological causation, as Kant does, as a result of a reflective judgment[7] on the part of beings like us, organic things really are causes and effects of themselves. In so far as all beings in nature

[2] See Alison Assiter, "Kant and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Evil", *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement,* Volume 72 / July 2013, 275–296, for some discussion of attempts to solve this problem for Kant.

[3] See Assiter 2015, Chapter 3.

[4] Immanuel Kant*, Critique of Practical Reason,* Edited and translated by Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 26. Original German Edition of Kant's works, Kant Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin:Walter de Gruyer, 1900, Vol. 5, 29.

[5] Friedrich W. J. Schelling, *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom,* trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006, translation of the *Freiheitsschrift*, in the *Sämmtliche Werke,* Beck & Oldenbourg: Munich, 1959.

[6] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987. CJ

[7] Kant, CJ,

are active, therefore, there is a form of freedom in the whole of nature. The bacterium, for example, makes a rudimentary "choice" about where to get nourishment. Correlatively, causal laws are understood as manifestations of the powers or the dispositions of objects. It is not completely determined, in advance, in the fashion assumed by some common accounts of causal laws, how these powers manifest themselves. As Kant himself suggests, in the *Critique of Judgment*, a seed gives rise to the tree, but it is not determined precisely in advance exactly how the tree will appear.

This view might appear to some to be "weird" or "fanciful" in so far as it seems to challenge many taken-for-granted assumptions about the natural world. It is a view that is distinct on the one hand from "scientistic" naturalism – a perspective that challenges any reference to 'transcendental grounds, orders, causes, purposes, Ding an Sich, or the like'[8] and also from theories that assert a dualism of fact and value. While I will not be arguing against these theories in this paper and in favour of a Schellingian form of naturalism, I will merely note at the outset that Schelling's form of naturalism may in fact fit some contemporary scientific theories better than the form that rejects purposes or powers as "occult" and "weird".[9] The view of nature assumed in this paper is similar to that accepted by a number of contemporary biologists,[10] and it is interesting that they, in their turn, draw more from Kant's *Critique of Judgment* than they do from his earlier work.

Schelling's conception of value, moreover, circumvents the problem of it being either wholly outside the natural world and therefore having no relation to we finite beings, or as somehow reducible to our interests and desires and therefore having limited normative force.

I will argue, in this paper, that Haufniensis, in CA, gives an account of the origin of freedom, drawing on Schelling's *Freiheitsschrift,* through the story of Adam and Eve. Kierkegaard asks: "Is the concept of hereditary sin identical with the concept of the first sin, Adam's sin, the fall of man?"[11] On Kant's

[8] Yervan H. Krikorian (ed.) Epilogue, "The Nature of Naturalism", in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1944, quoted in Fiona Ellis, *God, Value and Nature,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 9.

[9] See Ellis, 2014 for references to theories that view powers as dubious kinds of entity.

[10] See, for example, Lynn Margulis, "Biologists Can't Define Life", in *From Gaia to Selfish Genes: Selected Writings in the Life Sciences,* edited by C. Barlow (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1991).

[11] Ibid. 25

reading of the story, the existence of Adam doesn't explain anything. If Adam is inside the history of finite limited beings, then his sin is just like the sin of everyone else. If, on the other hand, he is placed wholly outside history, then he has no relation to everyone else's sin precisely because he is placed outside this world. Adam's sin does not explain the sin of others if his sin is seen either as a first cause in a series of mechanical causes or as a certain kind of rational explanation for sin. If the story, in other words, is read through a metaphysic that radically separates the free being from the natural world, which is itself conceived in terms of deterministic causation, then the story cannot explain the origin of sin. Indeed, read in this way, the story illustrates the extreme and intuitively odd view, that is common in debates on free will, that, in order really to be free, in the libertarian sense, one has to break the laws of nature.[12]

Instead, Kierkegaard writes "by the first sin, sinfulness *came into Adam*".[13] The position is the same, indeed, for every other human being. The concepts with which Kantian speculative reason deals belong in logic whilst the notion of sin lies in ethics. Innocence is a natural state of the natural being that may continue in existence. Innocence is ignorance.

Kierkegaard's account, I believe, can be reconstructed to run as follows: in the biblical story, Eve and Adam, as natural beings, in a world of similarly constituted natural beings, existed. Adam and Eve, in other words, were part of a living and active natural world that pre-existed the domain of the free and thinking being. Adam was neither free nor not free. He had no awareness of the possibility of choice. Eve – in some way a derived person – came into being later. She, via the serpent, seduced Adam. At that point, Adam became aware, through sensuality, of good and evil. By the first sin, sinfulness, or the capacity to reflect on our passions and desires and to enact some and not others – in other words human freedom – came into Adam. Adam may have existed alongside other natural objects with their powers and capacities. These natural objects possessed powers and capacities that were akin to our human conceptual apparatus but they were also different. The natural objects existing alongside Adam were not, in other words, purely

[12] See, for example Peter van Inwagen, "An argument for Incompatibilism", in Gary Watson (ed.) *Free Will*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

[13] Ibid. 33 (my italics).

inert mechanical things. Strictly, human freedom emerged first in Eve, rather than Adam. '… the woman was the first to be seduced and, that therefore she in turn, seduced the man'.[14]

Adam, as well as each subsequent individual, is responsible for his own sin. The explanation, according to Haufniensis, of Adam's sin, must also explain the sin of every other person. Adam, or Eve, as the first individuals, both represent themselves and "the race". "With sinfulness, sexuality was posited. In that same moment the history of the race begins".[15]Adam and Eve, prior to the act of eating the fruit, are in a dream like state of anxiety. "Innocence is ignorance. In innocence, man is not qualified as spirit, but is psychically qualified in immediate unity with his natural condition".[16] Freedom "enters into" Eve via a "qualitative leap".[17] In other words, Eve existed alongside all other natural beings, and she emerged, as they did, from their grounds.

There are two points Kierkegaard is making, then, in response to Kant. Firstly, the free will cannot be wholly outside time because it would be unable to operate if it were so placed. But secondly, although Kierkegaard accepts Kant's point that the notion of freedom of the will cannot be explained in either logical or mechanical causal terms, he would not accept the conclusion, that this means that it cannot be explained at all. For Kant, either Adam is wholly outside history, or he is wholly inside history. These alternative options encapsulate the division outlined earlier between speculative dualism and reductive naturalism. But there is a third alternative: namely that Adam is partly inside and partly outside history – the history of beings like us. He is outside it as an innocent and natural being and inside it as a being that has become rational and free.

Kant's difficulty explaining the notion of freedom to do wrong stems from his radical separation of the free will from the finite natural phenomenal being. It stems, furthermore, in Kierkegaard's view, from Kant's restriction

[14] Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety*. Edited and translated by Reidar Thomte, in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. CA, 7.

[15] CA, 52.

[16] CA, 41.

[17] Haufniensis distinguishes his own understanding of this "leap" from Hegelian logical understanding. "Hegel's misfortune is exactly that he wants to maintain the new quality and yet he does not want to do it, since he wants to do it in logic…" (CA, 30, footnote). Hegel's conception of the leap is contrasted there with that of Schelling.

of nature to that which can be accessed by human phenomenal experience. Nature, for Kierkegaard, then, by contrast, must be understood in two ways: firstly as human nature – natural inter-subjective embodied experience. But there is also a second sense of the notion – the living dynamic nature that includes plants, bacteria and other animals and that, according to this reading, included Adam and Eve prior to the emergence in them of freedom.

Haufniensis argues, further, that sin or evil results from the self taking itself as its own ground. When we do this, we are likely to be following our own desires or our own rationalisations for our behaviour and we lose the normative force of an independent ground. Kant was forced to look for the ground of evil either in our own nature, in which case, on his assumptions, we are not really free, or in some external and wholly evil source. For Kant, when the individual acts from the moral law, a law that she herself, at least according to many readings of Kant, prescribes, she is approximating as closely as she possibly can to a "holy will" or a perfectly rational being. But, according to Schelling and Kierkegaard, it is not possible for the self ever to be a perfectly rational being or a holy will; thought cannot ground itself.

This point applies whether one accepts a "constructivist" or a "realist" account of Kantian morality. In a recent book, Robert Stern has persuasively argued that the "constructivist" view, which grounds ethical norms in the self-legislating subject, while it is indeed plausible as far as the agent's autonomy is concerned, it fails to offer a reason for the obligatory nature of moral commands. Kant, according to Stern, accepts a "hybrid" view. He is a constructivist about the obligatory – it is we ourselves who "give the content of morality its obligatory form".[18] On the other hand, he is a "realist" about the right – his notion of the "holy will", which is a will that is perfectly good, functions as a "moral fact" on the basis of which agents like us make choices.

This account, while it offers an important corrective to many constructivist readings, still leaves open the question, for Kant, of the ground of wrongdoing.

The reading of CA I am offering retains the advantages of Stern's account of Kant. The ultimate ground of choosing to act well, for Kierkegaard, is independent of the self, in that it is nature, but a nature that is itself grounded in God. But the self is also relatively independent of her ground and thus

[18] Robert Stern, *Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

she retains a degree of autonomy and responsibility for her actions. She is autonomous in so far as she acts from her own power, but the source of her moral norms comes from a nature that is external to her, and that is, in turn, grounded in God. In a sense therefore, her actions are "self caused" in so far as they stem partially at least from her own power.

Freedom, then, for Haufniensis, involves the possibility of committing evil acts. This Haufniensis refers to as "anxiety about evil".[19] The only way that this anxiety can be replaced by the alternative – a concern with the good, is through faith. 'The only thing that is truly able to disarm the sophistry of sin is faith.' [20] In other words, sin involves failing to recognise the grounding of the self in something external to it, while acting well involves a recognition of this grounding. Only, for Haufniensis, though, if one goes a step further than simple evil, into the demonic, is freedom somehow curtailed.[21] Haufniensis describes the demonic as "anxiety about the good" and as "unfreedom".[22] This is a state where the individual has been taken over and consumed by evil. Again we can see a critique of Kant here.

We might therefore read Kierkegaard as suggesting that, while many thinkers and Kant in particular, believed that it was important to account for the freedom to act well, in fact, it is equally, if not more important, to account for the freedom to do wrong. On Kierkegaard's account, then, each organic object consists in a concatenation of powers or capacities. Each "thing" is part of the creative process that is the whole of nature. Eve's act both sets her apart from the rest of nature and maintains her continuity with this nature.

Once freedom has "emerged" in them, humans have a degree of responsibility for their natures that other organic things do not have. When Eve acts wrongly, her act stems from a power that is internal to her. Her acts stem from her capacities or her powers, which, in turn, inform her choices. There is an element of "self-causation"[23] in the whole of nature but Eve has this to a greater degree than other natural objects.

[19] CA, 131.

[20] CA, 117.

[21] See CA, 118–136.

[22] CA, 123.

[23] This is conceived in a weaker sense than the Kantian "absolute spontaneity".

Zupancic[24] makes the point that Kant needs an infinitely existing body to be able to explain moral conversion and she refers to de Sade. Kierkegaard suggestively implies, though, that the two notions – an imaginary infinitely existing body and a perfectly rational will – stem from the same problematic assumptions: that the will and the body are radically separate. De Sade's seeking of endless pleasure parallels the Kantian rational will, in so far as such a will, in parallel fashion, imagines an infinite rationality.

Freedom, for Haufniensis,[25] "came into" Eve through sexuality. It is appropriate, indeed, for freedom to emerge, initially, into a body that can birth. For birth, or procreation, is the means by which species reproduce themselves and the means by which one species emerges from another. It is also the metaphor Schelling uses for the "ungrund" – the "yearning of the one to give birth to itself".[26]

Haufniensis writes, in CA, "woman is more sensuous than man".[27] "That woman is more sensuous than man appears at once in her physical structure (…) aesthetically her ideal aspect is beauty (…). Then I shall introduce her ethically in her ideal aspect which is procreation". [28] Eve is "more sensuous" and therefore more anxious than Adam partly, and importantly, because she has the capacity, or potency, to give birth. Indeed, perhaps it is because of the latter that she is the former. A greater degree of anxiety, for Haufniensis, signifies strength rather than weakness. "Although anxiety belongs to her (Eve) more than man, anxiety is by no means a sign of imperfection".[29] In so far as she has the capacity to give birth, she illustrates in bodily form, as well as in "spirit", the self in process; the self both as organic process and as free being, a potentiality capable of becoming a number of possible selves – of taking up and believing a number of possible ideas and of acting in a multiplicity of ways. Eve is effectively re-born as a free self capable of

[24] Alenka Zupancic, *Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan,* London: Verso, 2000, 80–82.

[25] I am using the pseudonymous author of CA. However I believe that there are continuities in the various pseudonymous texts of Kierkegaard as well as between these and the works written in Kierkegaard's own name.

[26] Schelling, 2006: 59, VII, 395.

[27] CA, 64.

[28] CA, 65.

[29] CA, 47, footnote.

good and bad actions. Moreover, as Anti-Climacus put it in SUD, in "willing to be itself, the self is transparently grounded in the power that established it".[30] The "power that established it" can be read, at least in part, in the Schellingian sense of a grounding of the self in an original event of creation of the whole and in a process of "ejecting love", a process that "yearns" to give birth to itself. Haufniensis uses language reminiscent of Schelling, when he writes that when sin comes into the world, sin "acquired significance for the whole creation (…) The meaning of this I can indicate by calling attention to the Scriptural expression ἀποκαραδοκία της κτίσεως (the eager longing of creation) (Romans 8.9)".[31]

The self is also grounded in the "dark ground", or a further potential, that leads to anxiety. The "dark ground" is the potentiality in the ground of God for evil. Subjective anxiety, then, is anxiety in the face of the recognition of the potential that lies at the heart of the human being. The deity is born out of the opposing forces that constitute its ground. In a footnote, in CA, when discussing the creation, Haufniensis refers to these metaphors of Schelling. He writes: "By these expressions he signifies, if I may say so, the creative birth pangs of the deity".[32]

The reading I am offering of the Eve story is consonant with a Schellingian inspired influence on Kierkegaard. It is consistent with a picture according to which: "matter itself becomes, in some manner difficult to conceive, capable of participation in the form of the understanding".[33] For Schelling, as Iain Hamilton Grant puts it, "subjectivity arises in nature".[34] Kierkegaard, though, adds a phenomenological account of the emergence of the specific form of control that agents like us have, over the powers of which we are comprised, that constitutes one element of libertarian freedom.

On this account, there is no radical separation between freedom and nature. Rather the self, like other organic things, is comprised of powers or

[30] Søren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness unto Death*. Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, SUD, 14

[31] CA, 57–58.

[32] CA, 59.

[33] Grant, 2006: 37

[34] Grant, 2006: 162.

capacities. Some of these are purely bodily powers, like the power of chewing. But others are expressed in the form of conscious choices to act in certain ways, and these choices and these acts, in turn, shape our natures.

Kierkegaard's Response to Kant

In innocence, for Kierkegaard in CA, "man" is not qualified as spirit. Man is neither a beast nor an angel. "If he were a beast or an angel, he could not be in anxiety".[35] He is neither animal nor is he rational. Kierkegaard – or rather the pseudonymous author Haufniensis – outlines how the state of innocence in the Garden of Eden is precisely that. There is no knowledge of good and evil. Eve cannot understand the prohibition. There is peace and repose. But what else is there? Nothing. Nothing has the effect of producing anxiety. Anxiety is "freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility".[36] Man is a synthesis of the "psychical and the physical". Anxiety "passes into Adam as the possibility of possibility".

When Kant writes, as he does in his work *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*,[37] about the origins of freedom, he prioritises reason. Freedom comes about, according to him, from someone in the Garden, seeing two fruits and choosing between fruits. But this version of the story presupposes the very thing it is setting out to explain – freedom – which is, no doubt, why Kant ultimately came to regard the origin of sin as inexplicable. For Kierkegaard, instead, the moment "spirit" enters into Adam, it must posit also – since the human is the synthesis of the psychic and the bodily – its antithesis in the sensual, and the most extreme form of the sensuous is the sexual. Adam was beguiled by Eve who was "more sensuous" and therefore more anxious, than him. Without sin there is no sexuality; the moment Adam becomes man, he does so by becoming animal as well.

It might be argued, however, in an objection to this account, that on Haufniensis' account as well, the capacity to choose must already have existed in Adam. After all, Eve and Adam knew about the prohibition. But the

[35] CA, 155.

[36] CA, 42.

[37] Immanuel Kant, Conjectural Beginning of Human History, in *Anthropology, History, Education,* Vol. 10, Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. and trans Robert B. Louden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 160–175.

reading I am offering suggests that Eve was not, prior to the eating of the fruit, a fully free being. The prohibition on her, at that time, functioned rather as a limit on the extent of her world, a little like a fence in a zoo round a lion.

On a Kantian view, the burden of guilt becomes debilitating. Kant eventually explains "sin" as innate in all of us and as constantly tempting us away from the moral law. For Kierkegaard, though, as free and finite rational beings, we are continually both rational and sensuous; we are free to choose to do good, in terms of the love that comes from sensuality and ultimately from the ground of the whole of nature. Or we are free to choose the bad and when we do this we are taking ourselves as the source of our norms. For Kierkegaard, then, freedom is conceived partly as the spontaneous capacity of the natural and rational being but also as the partial shaping of this being by a norm, or a power, that stems from external nature – a nature that is living and active and grounded in a God that itself comes into being.

Kierkegaard, then, has open to him a form of explanation that is not available to Kant. It arises from his recognition that a human being is a paradox – a synthesis of two opposing notions. But this paradoxical nature of the human being does not suggest nonsense. Rather it suggests that explanations in ethics must take a different form from explanations in logic or in those domains of thinking that are governed by mechanical causation. If there is, as Grant's reading of Schelling implies, a naturalistic explanation of ideas, "a physical explanation of idealism"[38], there may be a natural grounding of the mind and of mental phenomena. This natural grounding cannot be a purely mechanical one, for such a ground would not have the capacity to give rise to human mental abilities. Although the myth of Eve and Adam is just this – a myth – it is a myth that provides an explanation for something, the origin of freedom, that otherwise remains inexplicable. It fits with a deep form of metaphysical naturalism, which sees mental phenomena being grounded in a powers based and active nature.

Kant sees freedom as arising rationally out of thoughts' capacities and out of an awareness of "the prohibition". Freedom, according to Kierkegaard, though, is the "anxious possibility of being able" crucially formed through

[38] See F. W. J. Schelling, *Ages of the World,* transl. Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, New York: Columbia University Press, 1942; and Grant, Iain Hamilton. *On an Artificial Earth: Philosophies of Nature after Schelling,* London: Continuum, 2006.

sensuality. It is ultimately be grounded, to reiterate, in a Being like Schelling's Absolute – or the ungrounded ground of this Absolute – Schelling's *ungrund.* As Schelling puts it in *The Ages of the World* "necessity and freedom are in God".[39] The ground of the good lies in nature, but crucially nature understood as being active and dynamic and as existing outside the limits of possible human experience.

For Kierkegaard, after the emergence of freedom in Eve, the future is wide open. It consists in a range of possibilities, an "abyss" that creates anxiety in the self. The future, for each self, therefore, is not determined, either by causal forces outside its own nature, or, as it might be seen to be for Kant, by its own rationality. Kierkegaard's self is shaped by its own capacities or powers. Humans have, then, the kind of control over their volitions that is required for libertarian freedom.

Overall, the attempt to provide a complete explanation for ethical notions, in the way that Kant sets out to do, is, Kierkegaard argues, bound to fail. Human beings have agency precisely in so far as they are not perfectly rational – determined by their reason – or determined by their desires.

Kierkegaard's response to Kant, then, is as follows: Haufniensis does not face the difficulty that befalls Kant's theory since he does not separate out, in the fashion of Kant, the "rational" self that follows a norm, from the sensible, natural self. For Haufniensis, selfishness and sinfulness, as well as the capacity for good, come into being with freedom. Prior to the act of eating the fruit, these characteristics of an actual person were non-existent. For Kierkegaard, sin and evil are contingently given as a result of freedom and are not, as Kant suggested, innate. Kierkegaard, then, can make sense of the Augustinian distinction between *pecatum originale* – the first sin – and actual sin – the sin as realised by an actual existing individual. It is difficult for Kant, however, to make sense of this distinction, since he argues that sin is innate.

The self of CA is a combination of two things – it is a synthesis of "body and soul", "temporality and eternity", "finitude and infinitude"[40] and necessity and freedom. But it is one self that exemplifies each of these apparently conflicting notions. The self is partly grounded in God and partly independent of God. This position does not make sense if one assumes either the

[39] F. W. J. Schelling, *Ages of the World*, 5.

[40] See CA, 155.

reductive naturalism outlined at the beginning of this paper or a Kantian, or any other, dualism. But it does make sense on a view that sees the self as in process, as in a process of becoming something other than it might previously have been. The processual self is made up of finite and biological powers, like the power of eating, but also of capacities to follow norms stemming from outside itself. In their turn, though, these stem from a natural world which contains the self but that "culminates" in a God, conceived in the fashion I have outlined here.

Much of the discussion in this paper uses metaphor. The story of Adam and Eve is just that – a story. But it is important to note that scientists, as well as artists and story-tellers, use metaphor. As Mary Hesse put it: "The world does not come naturally parcelled up into sets of identical instances for our inspection and description".[41]

On the assumptions outlined in this paper, the idea that we have some responsibility for the nature that we now have may not be as ludicrous as some have taken it to be.[42] The paper offers a challenge to the view put by Nagel, that, "when looked at from far enough outside, agents are helpless and not responsible".[43]

Using Haufniensis' story of Adam and Eve, this paper has outlined an approach to freedom and evil that does not give rise to Kant's difficulty – that of explaining the freedom to do wrong.

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[41] Hesse, M., "Tropical Talk; the Myth of the Literal", *The Aristotelian Society*, 61, (supplement): 1987, 297–310, 311

[42] See, for one example of such a view, Galen Strawson, "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility", in Watson (ed.) 2003.

[43] Thomas Nagel, "Freedom", in Watson, (ed.) 2003, 231.

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BEFORE THE WORD. KIERKEGAARD, AN ARTIST WITHOUT WORKS

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Abstract
The aim of this study is to analyze the ways in which Kierkegaard questions the idea of a book as a unitary work throughout his prolific writings, such as in his conception of the reader and his experimentation with the idea of a book in works such as *Prefaces* (1844). International research has usually paid attention to Kierkegaard's critique of authority thanks to his pseudonyms and hiding strategies, but his challenge to the metaphysics of reading remains generally unexplored. Since a metaphysical conception of author is linked to a determinate idea of work and reader, this paper will tackle the status of Kierkegaard's *oeuvre* through consideration of Jean-Yves Jouannais' "artist without work" category. In spite of facing the dilemma of remaining silent or saying something, Kierkegaard generates an unlimited, plural and torrential textuality, which is based in a space of secrecy and unreadability. This space of non-determination (de)constitutes the work of art and offers an opportunity for alterity, endless re-interpretation, and both philosophical and literary critique.

Keywords
Kierkegaard, phallogocentrism, work of art, deconstruction, écriture, dis-empowering

1. The Death of the Work

Kierkegaard, like Artaud, subverts the critical and the clinical. He challenges the critical that extracts *the* meaning from the text, the critical that

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hierarchically organizes a work, and demarcates the text as a homogeneous whole excluding rebelliousness in the face of an imposed meaning. And he questions as well the clinical that finds in the tortured life of the author – in his madness or in his epilepsy (or even in the dramatic circumstances of his existence) – the source of the author's work and the definitive frame for understanding it. Even if the goal of the clinical is not to discredit the work, but rather to disclose a sort of structure for human existence and creation; and even if creative madness is acclaimed in the clinical, it preserves the metaphysical humanism which links categories such as work, author, and madness with the age of subjectivity.[1]

But in some way Kierkegaard went further, and subverted the process through which we usually assimilate the act of creation to madness and the production of an artwork; he removed any aura of doom – of the idea of literature as transgression, and of its connatural revolutionary nature – and he avoided embracing the old bourgeois status of the book-world. The metaphysics of commentary, which intends to control meaning through categories such as work and author, text and corporality, writing and existence, soul and body, was only possible when metaphysics already governed the commented works. However, Kierkegaard's textuality withdraws from this metaphysics of reading and writing, from the law and its transgression, and presents itself as a dissident experimentation. It is an exercise in dissidence that finds its effectiveness in textual experimentation.

We know Kierkegaard killed the Father, and we know that one of his main goals was to destroy the organic status of the author through the proliferation of his pseudonyms. Canonical texts on this question, such as "A First and Last Explanation" from the *Postscript* (1846), *The Point of View* (1848), and *On My Work as an Author* (1849), among many others, have been studied in detail in order to show that the author function never rises above the pseudonyms in any of these texts. The latest research on this question has insisted on the fact that Kierkegaard's aim when talking about his literary production is not to tell the truth,[2] but rather to confuse, fictionalize, and distort even more the multiplication of voices that constitutes what we

[1] Cf. "La parole soufflée", in Derrida 1967: 253ff.

[2] About this question, see Garff 1997: 75–102; Perarnau 2004: 96–112, and Sáez Tajafuerce 2015: 43–65.

obstinately continue to call his "work" – even when the figure of the author who was behind that work has long been absent.

Kierkegaard continually dis-authorizes himself as an author: "after my death no one will find even the least bit of information in my papers (this is my consolation) about what has really filled my life; no one will find that which is written in the core of my being that explains everything."[3] Nevertheless, the evidence contained in this affirmation has not banished the metaphysics of commentary. Kierkegaard's text is still at the mercy of the critical, even if the clinical lost its chance. The text is still conceived as a unitary work, the fragment is still thought of as a piece to be fit into the final puzzle, and very little attention is paid to the radical and truly subversive fact that, by killing the Father, Kierkegaard put an end to the Son as well – that is, to the work as Son. He ruined the organic character of the work. In short, he paved the way for experimentation through a writing that grows someplace else.

What is that place? What would writing without works be? And what would "the sense of an art which does not generate works"[4] be? Kierkegaard fights this merciless war within the very core of his writing. The "artists without works," who conform to Jean-Yves Jouannais' legendary gallery,[5] take the problem of the artwork into everyday life. Their refusal to become fathers, and their rejection of production, are translated into the life of a *shandy* – an artist's life that does not produce anything because the artist transforms life itself into a work of art. Only memory and myth are able to recover the intangibility of what is not written, because there is no library, museum, or market that can preserve as a well-ordered whole that never formed. But Kierkegaard's case is very different, since he is able, unlike them, to avoid production while writing: he produces a non-productive writing, a textuality without work. And this is precisely the reason why Kierkegaard voluntarily fades away as an artist and as an author. In a single move, he abandons the two major categories of the logocentrism of our culture: the author and the work (which is not achieved by Jouannais' "artists without works"). It is through writing that the text withdraws itself from the work.

[3] *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*, vol. 18. Abbreviated as "SKS".

[4] Jouannais 1997:57.

[5] *Idem*.

Thus everything is compromised in the way in which this writing puts its own status as a product into question. The subversion of its role as a son, and of its relation with the Father-Author, is at stake.

To achieve this subversive writing, the text has to be developed before the Word. This is the case in Kierkegaard's *Prefaces* (*Forord*), but also found in other texts such as in Kierkegaard's characterization of Antigone. If the author is meant to have words and language at hand in order to configure the work, and even if he experiments with a primary alienation when he acknowledges that reading always precedes his writing, his mission is still to configure a work and to arrange language. And, to place text before the Word also means to leave the position of author. Kierkegaard's prefaces to non-existent books play this role. They start before the discourse and the Word can begin to make sense, so they abort any possible production at its very origin. This is because Kierkegaard's prefaces face the challenge of finding a way to avoid becoming a book and to remain detached from the discourse about the unity of the book.

In the same way as "the art of writing posthumous fragments", which is mentioned in "Ancient Tragedy's Reflection in the Modern" (*Either/Or Part I*), writing is developed in a space where there is no present, a space *before* present. The text about modern Antigone is incomplete, a mere "sketch," like a handful of indications by the theater director for a work that has yet to be performed and that will never be performed, because it is neither showable nor presentable: it does not have a present that could return, but it is rather a non-representable *reste* that can appear before any totality. It is not a left-over that was expelled out from a meaningful work, nor is it from the margin of the system, but rather it is the Word that refuses to be subjected to any systematicity (like the Son who refuses his nature as a son and does not write letters to the Father anymore).

It is in the first of the prefaces that this paternal, phallogocentric structure is radically put into question, that the classic choice between writing and getting married, work and life, authority and paternity, is radically denied. The death of the work is intimately linked with the death of paternity.

2. Before the Word

You can't have one without the other
Frank Sinatra, "Love and Marriage" (lyrics by Sammy Cahn)

But how can we say that Kierkegaard did not produce works when he claimed "to produce was my life"?[6] How can we affirm that Kierkegaard avoided any kind of speaking when he actually multiplied the voices of discourse, spoke in many languages and styles, with different names, even posthumously? Indeed, Kierkegaard never stopped talking. And it is this excess, this overflowing of the word, which proves the lack of the presence of the Word. This excess shows that "the System," as young Kierkegaard used to call it, can only be written as a deferred promise.[7]

Despite remaining silent, Kierkegaard spoke to excess, and it was by speaking to excess that he could avoid saying anything – that is, he could escape the metaphysical trap that conceives of language as a captor of the real, as a useful and aseptic instrument that arranges and shapes the real. This is, perhaps, the main problem Kierkegaard dealt with in his main contributions to philosophy: irony, indirect communication, writing as distance (*The Moment*), pseudonymity. So, the question is: how does one build a non-systematic, non-conceptual and objectless language without falling mute; how does one cultivate a resounding silence that would be able to address someone without saying anything?[8] We can consider such writing as peripheral or marginal writing, as writing that turns around a spectral center. Or, we can also consider it to be adverbial writing:[9] far from believing in the presentation of the Word, it understands language as a deferred promise of sense, as the atrium or the hall of a non-appearing Word – being close to or far from meaning, which is essentially the opportunity for meaning.

[6] *Pap.* X 1 A 442.

[7] SKS 4, 478.

[8] Derrida writes "Parler pour (ne) *rien* dire, ce n'est pas ne pas parler. Surtout, ce n'est pas ne parler à personne." (Derrida 2003 : 147).

[9] It is Derrida again who suggests in "Comment ne pas parler? Dénégations" the adverbial character of language (Derrida 2003: 184).

Kierkegaard's *Prefaces* may be, with the *Postscript*, one of the clearest exercises of this peripheral writing that speaks without meaning. Either *before* or *after* the Word, when all has been said or when there is nothing to say, there is the place where writing begins. This writing is like a preface or prologue before the words. And all of this is done through the funny story of the domestic arguments between a poor husband, Nicolaus Notabene, and his irate wife, who does not want her husband to become a writer. The reason is simple: for her, writing is the worst of infidelities[10] because it turns a husband into a complete absentee[11] who does not care about the home and does not pay any attention to his wife. All he does is remain lost in his thoughts, in a utopian hereafter.

The intransigent annoyance of Notabene's wife is a funny version of the old rivalry between writing and marriage, or between artwork and wife, that so many artists and writers during the 19th and 20th centuries have accepted and reflected on.[12] We find it, for instance, in Van Gogh's letters,[13] Balzac's short tale *Le Chef-d'œuvre inconnu*, Zola's novel *L'Œuvre* that shares similarities with episodes from Cézanne's life, and particularly Kafka's *Journals*. In essence, "to write or to get married,"[14] as Derrida pointed out in *Donner la mort* when he talked about several similarities between Kafka and Kierkegaard, who has also too often been seen as a writer tormented by the idea of taking a wife.[15] In this sense, this rivalry is an expression of romantic

[10] SKS 4, 474.

[11] SKS 4, 473.

[12] We could go even further, since we can find in Molière's *Les femmes savantes* the same competition when we read (Acte V, scène III, verses 1663–1666):

> L'esprit n'est point du tout ce qu'il faut en ménage;
> Les livres cadrent mal avec le mariage;
> Et je veux, si jamais on engage ma foi,
> Un mari qui n'ait point d'autre livre que moi

[13] Cf. Van Gogh 2013.

[14] Kafka wrote "What made me desist was mainly the consideration of my work as a writer, since I felt this work was threatened by marriage" (1988: 153). We can even find this topic in Bukowski's tales about women and writing. The expression "*Écrire ou se marier*" can also be found in Blanchot's *De Kafka à Kafka* (Blanchot 1981).

[15] Cf. Vozza 2007.

misogyny, according to which the equation virility-activity-creativity-productivity-*logos*-Word[16] is established.

To take a wife (to have sexual relations, procreate, start a family, etc.) implied the loss of the artist's genius or creative fecundity, since artistic creation was symbolically assimilated to paternal procreation: both were considered to be a manifestation of virility, as a phallogocentric mechanism intended for the production of meaning. In both cases, it is about becoming masculine and becoming a father: on the one hand, one gets married, to become the head of a household, and have a Son (*phall*ogocentrism); on the other hand, one becomes an *author*, to produce *the* Word, the logos (phal*logo*centrism). Following this very logic, Notabene's wife declares war on her husband if he dares to become a writer. To become a writer would be infidelity, abandonment, betrayal (in short, taking up with another woman).

This tension of virility between creative writing and the procreative father is what leads the wife to consider Notabene's writing and discussion skills to be dispensable investments of energy, worthless activities that distract Notabene's attention away from his wife, who is his "daily bread".[17] The wife embodies the law of domestic economy; she aims at making a responsible and profitable use of her husband's virility to produce a home, instead of wasting it – like a Casino player[18] – on luxury goods – that is, on writing books. All the wife wants is the absolute and constant attention of her husband.

I'm not asking you for anything but your attention, says the woman, and with that she is asking him for everything. She demands that he should always be present for her, that he should be nothing more than something that observes and legitimates her. This means that Notabene will write as an *encliticon* of his wife.[19] This is to say that he will write as that which remains always *before* her, *by* her side, because the wife is considered here to be the custodian of productive virility and the keeper of the Word. If Notabene had chosen not to write and to fulfill his duty as a husband and future father, then the story would not have been very interesting. Notabene chooses to write,

[16] A classic in Spanish Kierkegaard studies is Amorós 1987.

[17] SKS 4, 473.

[18] SKS 4, 473.

[19] SKS 4, 474.

however, and he does it while still being a husband and rejecting the tension of virility (creator–procreator). This is why he writes prefaces: he has to write without producing, and without being an author; he must always write before the words (before saying, meaning, impregnating, etc.) and before the law which is his wife, who demands sense and fidelity. But what is someone who writes prefaces like? What is this writer figure like, like Kafka, Melville, Walser, and so many other sons without sons? As Notabene says:

> The end was that I promised not to insist on being an author […] I thus reserved for myself permission to venture to write Prefaces. In this connection I appealed to analogies, that husbands who had promised their wives never to use snuff any more had as recompense obtained permission to have as many snuffboxes as they wished.[20]

The prologue writer, then, is like those who enjoy tobacco without smoking or consuming it. He is like those who know that the best smoke is the one that has not burned anything. Here lies Notabene's solution to the dilemma of virility: it is the way in which, as a prologue writer, he evades the logic of virility and devotes himself to a proliferation without work, to writing before the Word. His task is to develop a textuality that breaks down the economy of production, a textuality based on the pleasure of suggestion, insinuation, flirting, and joking. It is a matter of avoiding the consummation of the meaning of words and cultivating the enigma of language, the mystery of its unresolved promise, a promise "suffocated at birth".[21] Let us consider how Notabene describes this curious insignificance of a writing without writing in the first of the prefaces:

> And the one who writes it, what is he like? He moves in and out among people like a dupe in winter and fool in summer; he is hello and good-bye in one person, always joyful and nonchalant, contented with himself, really a light-minded ne'er-do-well, indeed an immoral person, since he does not go to the stock exchange to feather his nest but only strolls through it; he does not speak at public meetings, because the atmosphere is too confined; he does not propose toasts in any society, because this requires notice several days in advance; he does not run errands on behalf of the system; he does not pay

[20] SKS 4, 476 / KW, 12.

[21] SKS 4, 471 / KW 7.

> installments on the national debt and in fact does not even take it seriously; he goes through life the way a shoemaker's apprentice walks whistling down the street, even though the one who is to use the boots stands and waits – then he must wait so long as there remains a single place left for sliding or the slightest object of interest to see. This, yes this is what one who writes prefaces is like.[22]

By rejecting the virile productivity of logos, the one who writes prefaces is but a trifle, a nobody, and a *nomen nescio* as Nicolaus Notabene's initials (NN) clearly suggest (SKS 4, 497). The one who writes prefaces is the inopportune note when everything else is already written, an impertinent comment or a *nota bene* to the Word. If the work's title refers to the anteriority of the Word, the pseudonym points to its posteriority – in this sense, it is a sort of anticipation of the *Postscript* (*Efterskrift*). Whether before or after, the text disturbs the Word and avoids saying anything, and this is why it stays disassociated from the system, as if it were a *restance* of metaphysics. Thanks to irony – that is, talking to say nothing –, it is so peripheral that it breaks the economy of critical commentary.

And so the prologue writer is useless, immoral, and unworried. He does not pay attention to the urgency of necessity, and he places amusement and pleasure before any kind of profitability. He sees language as a word game and as the deployment of literary pleasure, rather than as the solid presentation of meaning: it is his resistance to the latter that allows him to develop a critique of language as a system. The writer of prefaces, far from organizing a revolution against the metaphysical abuses of language, shows through games and jokes that the metaphysical project is inconclusive. He demonstrates that there is something in signs that resists being apprehended and digested as meaning, and in that rest he vindicates the joy of playing with signs, with its ambiguous, variable, and non-definitive character.

By being a prologue writer, it allows Notabene to evade the law without ceasing to obey it. It allows him to take it as a mere sign, as part of a game he plays, which turns his prefaces into a subversive formulation of desertion and demobilization. Experimental writing as a game and a joke becomes a great source of dissidence, performs a dispossession and a dis-empowering of textuality through a reflection on the insignificance of its body. And by

[22] SKS 4, 470/KW,6

showing the unsaturated nature of language and the non-apprehensible corporality of sense as a sign, Notabene confirms that he belongs to the city: he is just an insignificant, unpresentable author, a specter[23] that makes the reading of the text at once possible and impossible. He becomes indeterminable and unrecognizable because he walks among people without a name or a face; he is a nobody, certainly not a definite subjectivity whose biography could carry the reference and the definitive explanation of the text. That is why his first name is "Nicolaus" ("Niké" and "laus"), a name that denies the relevance of a unique name in favor of the anonymity of the people.

Thanks to this peripheral writing that avoids saying anything when speaking, Notabene's prefaces "must then have no subject to treat but must deal with nothing", even though they still aim to offer something.[24] The preface is thereby defined "purely lyrically and defined according to its concept"; so the prefaces become "liberated prefaces", in Notabene's words.[25] Released from the need to produce sense and obey the logic of virility, liberated prefaces can develop as a quest for the pleasure of the text. When we consider prefaces based on inessentiality and on the corporal dimension of signs, preface-writing is suggestive and seductive rather than referential, instrumental, or showable. According to Notabene, it is prefaces' attachment to the irresoluble character of desire and seduction that makes them different from discourse:

> Writing a preface is like sharpening a scythe, like tuning a guitar, like talking with a child, like spitting out of the window. One does not know how it comes about; the desire comes upon one […] Writing a preface is like ringing someone's doorbell to trick him, like walking by a young lady's window and gazing at the paving stones; it is like swinging one's cane in the air to hit the wind, like doffing one's hat although one is greeting nobody".[26]

With respect to preface-writing, it is no longer a matter of apprehending, taking, touching, conceptualizing, *saisir,* or *begrieffen*, but rather of grazing, caressing, and suggesting. It is about experimenting, tempting, and trying,

[23] SKS 4, 473.

[24] SKS 4, 469.

[25] SKS 4, 469 / KW 5.

[26] SKS 4, 469–470 / KW, 5.

about leaning out. Hence, it is about understanding the sign rather than the word. It is to understand the sign before the Word.

3. Conclusive Remark

The resolution to Nicolaus Notabene's domestic arguments have been neither a divorce, nor the birth of a renowned author in Danish society, nor a servile husband worried about his role as progenitor and head of a household. It has rather been a textual strategy to subvert and deactivate the phallogocentrism that still remained in each of those situations. This strategy of dissidence is not based on a revolutionary gesture, or on counter-argumentation, but it strives to turn the text into a space of dispossession, expropriation, and dis-empowering through the vindication of experimentation.

In conclusion, games, pleasure, and seduction – as features of the experience of reading – transform the text into something that always takes place before the word, as an adverb, as pertaining to the periphery, as an *encliticon*. It is a body that speaks without saying, a body in which there is room for many voices and styles. Even if Notabene is the most loyal of husbands, his marginal writings reveal a rift in the possibility of pure loyalty, pure presentation, or obedience to the law of productivity. This remaining rift, this tear, gives sonority to the silence of the text. It is the impossible place where the author and the work blow up in the same gesture, where the father and the son do not belong to each other anymore; it is the place where Kierkegaard does not want to say anything, but only invites us to read, and to read endlessly.

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KIERKEGAARD'S EXPERIMENTAL THEATRE OF THE SELF

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Abstract
Kierkegaard is not a dramatist nor an academic; he calls himself "a kind of philosopher" and has been called "a kind of poet", and he is a Christian who is at the same time one of Christendom's most devastating critics. I read him as "a dramatic philosopher" analogous to Shakespeare's dramatic poet, where his strategy and method in his philosophical journey to selfhood is a performance on the stage. However, this is no conventional stage but rather Kierkegaard creates a new landscape that allows himself and the reader to penetrate deeper into the plurality of the subject. His authorship is both experimental and dissident in that he defies the various genres and is located rather in the interlude of disciplines and activities. Kierkegaard fuses the combination of being an avid lover of theatre and fairytale, ancient and modern Western philosophy and German Romanticism, and having being brought up in a strict Christian background, into a rich retelling and unlocking of human existence. Central to my analysis is the short essay "The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress" which contains the three aspects of Kierkegaard: the performance itself, the philosophical analysis of the performance and a philosophy of life worth living. I interpret the author of this text, called Inter et Inter, as creating a modification on the activity of faith, where transformation (through the analysis of the actress Johanne Luise Heiberg) takes priority as a way of overcoming the failures of repetition in time, the continuous impossibility of faith, and the modern "age of disintegration" in ideas and society. Of course, Inter et Inter is yet another masked signature, located at the interlude, and we are invited to endless re-readings in this pioneering philosophical and theatrical space that Kierkegaard – as dramatic philosopher – has created for exploring and unfolding the elusive self in modernity.

Keywords
Interlude, transformation, dramatic philosopher, disintegration, actress

> There is a probably no young person with any imagination who has not at some time been enthralled by the magic of the theatre and wished to be swept along into that artificial actuality in order like a double to see and hear himself and to split himself up into every possible variation of himself, and nevertheless in such a way that every variation is still himself.
>
> – Constantin Constantius, *Repetition* [1]

> Then he said to them, 'Verily indeed you eat your food knowing this universal self as if it were many. He, however, who meditates on the universal self as of the measure of the span or as identical with the self, eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all selves.
>
> – *The Chandogya Upanishad* [2]

Introduction

I set out to present Kierkegaard as a "dramatic philosopher", whose authorship is both a theatrical performance in philosophy and an authorship which helps us, as readers, to prepare and flourish in our own performance, in the theatre of the self in life. As dramatic philosopher, this is both experimental and dissident as, first, Kierkegaard dissolves boundaries between disciplines; second, it allows him to assimilate his artistry or poetic impulse into his philosophy; third, this transforms philosophy into a form of praxis to be shared with a larger, democratic audience and public; fourth, it provokes theatre into giving space to philosophical perspectives and approaches on the stage; five, it allows Kierkegaard to showcase the philosopher of the "interlude"; six, it helps the reader and the author to understand and let unfold the plurality of the subject through various persons, masks, voices – or what I call the theatre of the self; and seven, it is a site for awakening to transformation and faith to combat what he calls "the age of disintegration [*Tidens Opløsthed*]" from an extraordinary journal entry from the revolutionary year of 1848.[3]

[1] Kierkegaard 1983: 154 / SKS4, 30.

[2] Radhakrishnan 1953: 440 [*The Chandogya Upanishad*, V.18.1].

[3] On the journal entry on the "age of disintegration", in which the term is mentioned seven times and as it he is giving an incendiary speech to the world from a pulpit, see Kierkegaard 1996: 350–351 [1848: IX B 63: 7]). He also uses this term at the beginning of the essay on "The Tragic in Ancient Drama" from *Either/Or. Part I* (Kierkegaard 1987a: 141 / SKS2, 141). In thinking of the background to "the age of disintegration", George Pattison has provided a

I will try to shed light on these seven aspects in navigating through three sections. I. Kierkegaard's Performance: Communication, Multiplicity and the Drama of Life; II. The Philosopher of the Interlude; and III. The Crisis of the Philosopher, the Actress and the Modern Age. All seven aspects are to be found in Kierkegaard's short essay – "The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress". There has been a variety of work already published on Kierkegaard as "performative author"[4] and on his essay on the actress, arguing for the importance of the essay for Kierkegaard's overall authorship and for understanding the relation between performance, confession, authorship and what it is to be a human being.[5] In this essay, I wish to continue and deepen this research by showing Kierkegaard as "dramatic philosopher" and "philosopher of the interlude" as a way and strategy of offering a theatre of the self. I focus on the importance of the essay on the actress as an example of the philosopher reflecting on the task of the great artist, and at the same time offering the possibility of a Kierkegaardian praxis via the interlude and the theatre of the self in the troubled "age of disintegration".

1. Kierkegaard's Performance: Communication, Multiplicity and the Drama of Life

Kierkegaard is certainly trying to find a new mode to express subjective human existence or the modern self, to forge a new space, a way of "staging the self". After the obsession with the dominant, melancholic father and his former fiancé Regine Olsen, there are perhaps four great passions in his life, the first two of which have already been given great attention – Christianity, Philosophy, Fairytales[6] and Theatre. The Portuguese poet, Fernando Pessoa, describes himself as being, like Shakespeare, "a dramatic poet" – having

careful and helpful analysis of Kierkegaard and the crisis of culture in the nineteenth century (See: Pattison 2002); and Robert B. Pippin has written a substantial study on the disintegration of values, "culture of rupture" and problems of modernity in the twentieth century (See: Pippin 1999).

[4] Westfall 2007: 1–18, 144–5.

[5] See, for example, Bukdahl 2001: 61; Crites 1967: 7–63; Pyper 2007: 299–320; Rose 1992: 19–20; Stock 2015: 367–380; Westfall 2007a: 223–228; Westfall 2007b; 321–344.

[6] On Kierkegaard and the fairytale, see my article Ryan 2014.

"the poet's inner exaltation and the playwright's depersonalisation";[7] with Kierkegaard we can add "philosophical passion" (a paradoxical formulation in itself – combining rationality and emotion, the secular and the religious) to the definition to forge the "dramatic philosopher". As a student divided between his theology exams and his passion for reading philosophy, it is theatre that allows him to bridge them. It is theatre that gives him the space to unleash the poet and which allows him to breathe vivid life into philosophy. We could put it this way that Kierkegaard's theatrical philosophy is a break from Hegel's philosophical drama and that this perhaps sums up the basic distinction here between the two – in that Kierkegaard presents the extraordinary in the everyday and the micro; while Hegel presents the extraordinary in human world history and the macro. Kierkegaard will crucially state that "Life is like a poet and thus different from the contemplator, who always comes to a finish; the poet wrenches us out in the middle of life."[8] One of Kierkegaard's first major international interpreters, Georg Lukács, famously wrote that Kierkegaard "makes a poem of his life".[9] Rather, I see Kierkegaard making a philosophical theatre of his life: dramatizing the self for philosophy, and publishing texts that are often like self-conscious stage directions with a variety of actors and prompters. This is most obvious in the explicitly philosophical-theatrical texts such as *Either/Or*, *Fear and Trembling*, *Repetition*, *Stages on Life's Way* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* with the various entrances and exits, with scenes, acts and interludes, and a plurality of perspectives, voices and digressions. As Stephen Crites pointed out in his excellent essay on "The Crisis and A Crisis in the Life of an Actress" back in 1967, drama is the art in which Kierkegaard knew best.[10] It is not merely the concepts and arguments that Kierkegaard brings to the philosophical table, but how and why he does it, and his locating of drama motifs and playwrights on an equal par with concepts and philosophers is experimental, dissident and pioneering.

[7] Pessoa 2001: 246 [Letter to João Gaspar Simões, 11th Dec 1931].

[8] Kierkegaard 1993: 73 / SKS8, 180.

[9] Lukács 1974: 30.

[10] Crites 1967: 19: "Drama was the art-form which he knew best and to which he felt most akin, but his observations were informed by a general theory of art which exhibits the intricate dialectical reflection he brought to all his work."

Theatre is also the site where concealing and revealing go hand in hand and are manifested most brilliantly. As Johannes de silentio says: "Recognition and hiddenness are also an essential element of modern drama."[11] The theatre and theatrics of Kierkegaard's authorship is one of the keys to the success of his strategy of indirect communication in his modern Socratic enterprise. On the actual stage, twelve years after Kierkegaard's death, Ibsen's Hamlet of the north, Peer Gynt, will sum up the vocation in a few words: "To speak, yet be silent? Confess, yet conceal – ?";[12] and as Kierkegaard's precursor, Shakespeare's Hamlet, says: "By indirections finde directions out."[13] However, Shakespeare/Hamlet and Ibsen/Peer Gynt are both characters and playwrights (perhaps the best); Kierkegaard is neither of these, but an experimental philosopher, a conflicted writer who does not know if he is a poet or an apostle in the face of a God, and in his quest for silence he keeps on speaking[14] and writing, appropriating and twisting theatre into his texts. Thus, the many pseudonyms and masks are created. Still under the spell of Kierkegaard, Lukács writes in his first major work: "The mask represents the great, two-fold struggle of life: the struggle to be recognised and the struggle to remain disguised."[15] Kierkegaard's philosophical theatre and poetic religiosity will ensure that he is trying to be honest before God and deceptive before humans.

One of the fundamental questions for Kierkegaard – 'what is the self?' – famously begins *The Sickness unto Death*.[16] Kierkegaard's answer is the unending suffering and joyful endeavour of a passionate, questioning, critical life. In seeking to unify the self, in the attempt "to will one thing" – declared in *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*,[17] Kierkegaard is creating at the

[11] Kierkegaard 1983: 84 / SKS4, 174.

[12] Ibsen 1994: 84 [*Peer Gynt*, Act 3 Scene 3].

[13] Shakespeare 1966: 1039 [*Hamlet*, Act 2, Scene 1, line 66].

[14] See, for example, the crucial journal entry from Easter 1848: "My whole being has changed. My concealment and reserve are broken – I am free to speak" (Kierkegaard 1996: 295 [19th April 1848, VIII I A 640]).

[15] Lukács 1974: 92. As early as 1835 at the age of 21, Kierkegaard ponders in his famous Gilleleje journal entry from 1835 that he will "construct a world which, again, I myself did not inhabit but merely held up for others to see?" (1 August 1835, I A 75).

[16] Kierkegaard 1980b: 14 / SKS11, 129.

[17] Kierkegaard 1993: 24 / SKS8, 138.

same time a multitude of selves. He is aware of this paradox, and it may be argued that in *A Point of View*, his supposedly spiritual autobiography, "the lady doth protest too much"[18] in trying to set the record straight that he was always in control of his authorship. It seems to be the contrary, even in his strange report to history which has multiple entrances, false starts and endings, appendices and postscripts. Of course, we are still trying to understand our interpreter of ourselves, but whether Kierkegaard likes it or not, he has enriched our conception of selfhood by paradoxically opening up a plurality of the subject in seeking out the single individual, and this crisis of the self is a crisis and *Zeitgeist* of early twentieth century modernism, which Kierkegaard foresaw, and which led, for a time, to a flourishing of art and ideas.

A clue to this chaos of multiplicity is in the lines by Hamann quoted by Constantin in *Repetition* and which was at one point to be used as the epigraph to the "Problemata" in *Fear and Trembling*: "I express myself in various tongues and speak the language of sophists, of puns, of Cretans and Arabians, of whites and Moors and Creoles, and babble a confusion of criticism, mythology, *rebus*, and axioms, and argue now in a human way and now in an extraordinary way."[19] Maybe the key to all of this "Babelian act of war"[20] is given by the shadowy voice of Constantin, who, despite the plurality and polyphony of the self in this magic theatre, says that "every variation is still himself."[21] Theatre provides the stage for this emotion of multiplicity, and philosophy is the discipline for analysing and dissecting the multiplicity. Remember that the subtitle of *Stages on Life's Way* is called "Studies by Various Persons", and the massive collection (compiled by Hilarius Bookbinder) begins with the mischievous words: "Inasmuch as there ought to be honesty in everything, especially in the realm of truth and in the world of books",[22] which is then followed by a very big 'nevertheless'. And Johannes de silentio explains that "if a person lacks this concentration, this focus [the power to concentrate the whole substance of life and the meaning of actuality into one single desire],

[18] Shakespeare 1966: 1051 [*Hamlet*, Act 3, Scene 2, line 224].

[19] Kierkegaard 1983: 149 / SKS4, 26.

[20] This phrase is from Jacques Derrida in his second of two essays on James Joyce called "Two Words for Joyce" (Derrida 1984: 147).

[21] Kierkegaard 1983: 154 / SKS4, 30.

[22] Kierkegaard 1988: 3 / SKS6, 11.

his soul is dissipated in multiplicity [*det Mangfoldige*] from the beginning."[23] Kierkegaard was already aware of this danger in his thesis *The Concept of Irony,* where the ironist becomes a multiplicity of selves through his moods: "He succumbs completely to mood. His life is nothing but moods [Hans Liv er *lutter Stemninger*] […] At times he is a god, at times a grain of sand. His moods are just as occasional as the incarnations of Brahma."[24]

But the despair and liberation is such (and this is another reason for Kierkegaard being a modernist) that this journey is non-teleological, that each person must sew the thread him or herself, as Johannes de silentio puts it.[25] We are often living in Nietzsche's vision of a godless, rudderless and confused epoch of modernism where the value system has fragmented, and the individual has become at the same time autonomous and part of a mass (modern democratic society). Kierkegaard's aesthete writes of the state of affairs:

> One wishes to be edified in the theatre, to be aesthetically stimulated in the church; one wishes to be converted by novels, to be entertained by devotional books; one wishes to have philosophy in the pulpit and a preacher on the lecture platform […] Our age has lost all the substantial categories of family, state, kindred; it must turn the single individual over to himself completely in such a way that, strictly speaking, he becomes his own creator.[26]

But where there is great crisis, there is the great opportunity for creativity and responsibility – in other words to becoming that Kierkegaardian self. Drama will respond to this "age of disintegration" after Kierkegaard via the explosive plays of disintegration and emancipation on the stage by Ibsen and Strindberg, and Pirandello and Beckett. Preceding this movement, we have Kierkegaard's dramatic philosophy. Johannes de silentio writes: "Modern drama has abandoned destiny, has dramatically emancipated itself, is sighted, gazed inward into itself, absorbs destiny in its dramatic consciousness."[27] Now the danger is that the modern world and the individual's inner life is, as Lukács pictures it, like Peer Gynt who "symbolizing the problem of

[23] Kierkegaard 1983: 43 / SKS4, 137.

[24] Kierkegaard 1989: 284 / SKS1, 320.

[25] Kierkegaard 1983: 45 / SKS4, 140.

[26] Kierkegaard 1987a: 149 / SKS2, 148.

[27] Kierkegaard 1983: 84 / SKS4, 174.

the essentiality, or lack of it, in his own life – peels an onion and finds no core, only peel."[28] It is fitting then that the quintessential play of modernity (*Hamlet*) begins with these first two words: "Who's there?" Kierkegaard's philosophical-theatrical texts are all circling around this haunting question.

2. The Philosopher of the Interlude

In tune with Kierkegaard's experimental theatre, his entire philosophical thought and project is located in the interlude (taking its cue from drama or musical piece – called the *Mellemspil* in Danish)[29] within the drama of philosophy. The philosopher of the interlude is interested in border-concepts such as anxiety or even the idea of the self; the interlude represents that space between waking and sleeping, an idle insomnia for creativity (seen so often in many of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms); and is situated as a philosophical ruin – crack, fragment or interruption; as well as being the performer or joker at the interlude of the play or musical – the word derives from the Latin "inter" signifying "between", and "ludus" – signifying "play". Thus, this interlude is explicitly referring to music and theatre, where in the chapter called "Interlude" [*Mellemspil*] in *Philosophical Fragments*, Johannes Climacus writes: "Also in a comedy there may be an interval of several years between two acts. To suggest this passage of time, the orchestra sometimes plays a symphony or something similar in order to shorten the time by filling it up. In a similar manner, I, too, have thought to fill the intervening time by pondering the question set forth."[30] And what happens then? The idle philosophical author, Johannes Climacus, then proceeds to give a concise and condensed historical analysis of metaphysical change, essence, being and finally belief through Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, Leibniz, Schelling and Hegel. This is a key moment of Kierkegaard as the

[28] Lukács 1980: 502.

[29] There is a wonderful tradition of the mischievous and sometimes infuriating interlude and extended digressions in classic eccentric literature such as along the margins of Swift's *Tale of a Tub*, the second preface to Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Héloise*, and the whole of Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* and Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*.

[30] Kierkegaard 1985: 72 / SKS4, 272.

ironic *Extra-Skriver*[31] [supplementary writer], whose "interlude" is the serious digression to distract the attention of the philosopher and the reader, to give material for the academic classroom, and it is interludes like these that anchor the whole performative enterprise or "fragment of philosophy" – which is the subtitle to *Philosophical Fragments*. It is also, crucially, in this interlude that Kierkegaard is revealing the limits of philosophy; and rather than do away with philosophy of which he is a lover of in both the Greek sense (of wisdom) and the Modern sense (of doubt), he is going to inject it with elusive yet concrete philosophers who don't write (Socrates), suffering religious figures (Abraham and Job), fairytales and fables (Icelandic sagas, Irish fairytales, Aesop's fables and tales from the Brothers Grimm), and playwrights (for example, Shakespeare obviously, and Denmark's golden age dramatists such as Oehlenschläger, Holberg and Heiberg).

Kierkegaard's dramatic philosophy invites performance as praxis in the face of totalising philosophy and closed political theologies, and which also allows for a hall of mirrors and set of masks that continually displaces disciplinary identity from one field to the next just as the moment seems clear. Theology masks politics; law masks theology; political theory masks philosophy; and psychology masks literary critical approaches. This thematic deferral of overarching traditional disciplinary codes is precisely Kierkegaard's interdisciplinarity, which is a refusal of fixed disciplinary boundaries. He is a Christian who is at the same time one of Christendom's most devastating critics, he sees himself as a poet against aesthetics and who never wrote poetry and a philosopher against philosophy and the philosophical system,[32]

[31] Kierkegaard 1983: 7 / SKS4, 103.

[32] He calls himself "a kind of philosopher" and has been called "a kind of poet" (Mackey 1971). Kierkegaard confides in his journals: "For between God and man there is a struggle and it's a matter of life and death – wasn't the God-man put to death? …about these things alone whole volumes could be written, even just by me, a kind of philosopher" (Kierkegaard, 1996: 353 [IX B 63:13 1848]). Examples of claiming and denying being a philosopher or poet are abundant in *Fear and Trembling*: "The present author is by no means a philosopher" (Kierkegaard 1983: 7 / SKS4, 103); "I am not a poet, and I go at things only dialectically" (Kierkegaard 1983: 90 / SKS4, 180) (This is the faltering, or negative, dialectics – preempting Adorno's project – pitting a non-totalizing Hegel against Hegel ["the whole is the false" versus "the whole is the true"]). Sometimes, has to be a poet (to find the *Stemning*) but speak dialectically. The reader needs to be engaged in both the poetic mood and dialectic argumentation and structures, and become like a child to grow into the religious mindset capable of understanding mythology

a bachelor who writes some of the greatest defences of marriage, living like a celibate monk who writes supreme diaries for seduction, and the lover and great master of the Danish language against the Golden Age of Danish Culture. Defying the various genres is both a blessing and a curse for him. Kierkegaard is mostly read by philosophers and philosophy departments who are not so sensitive to poetry and the dramatic arts – only teasing and seeking out the philosophical concepts and arguments; and then judged by literature departments who see him as too philosophical and religious; while theological departments often view him as too religiously provocative and radical or alternatively only wish to read him as a purely Christian author for Christians. Thus, he often remains a footnote to each discipline. These dislocations are perhaps what Kierkegaard would have wanted anyway, being the *Extra-Skriver*.

Taking just *Fear and Trembling* as an example, Kierkegaard's pseudonym – Johannes de silentio, who is the self-proclaimed *Extra-Skriver*, claims that he is poet and a philosopher at different moments, and also denies at different sections of the book that he is either. The title of the quintessential paradoxical text already captures the essence of Kierkegaard's theatrical interval: "Fear and Trembling: a dialectical lyric by Johannes de silentio". We are between theology ("Fear and Trembling" as a reference to Philippians 2:12 of the *New Testament*), philosophy ("dialectical"), poetry ("lyric"), and drama (in the creation of the pseudonym, mask, actor and art of deception to communicate the truth in Johannes de silentio). Or take *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* as another example, which is a text that is a marvelous performance that literally postfaces, postscripts or concludes (or all three) a fragment or book of crumbs (*Philosophical Fragments*) – which is probably his most focused, precise pseudonymous text.[33] As the philosophical con-

and the Genesis account, as well as adept with philosophical precision and linguistic exactness. Thus, there is forming here a balance or navigation between *mythos* and *logos*, neither of which we should lose in our pursuit of wisdom, knowledge and living "the good life".

[33] In many ways, Kierkegaard's philosophy of the interlude is continued in Derrida's performative philosophy – in both his framing and structuring of the texts and the content. Most obvious examples are *Dissemination*, *Glas* and *The Postcard*. This passage is a good indicator of the aspirations of Derrida and the author who writes along the frontiers and gaps between literature, philosophy, psychology and theology: "The god of writing is thus at once his father, his son, and himself. He cannot be assigned a fixed spot in the play of differences. Sly, slippery, and masked, an intriguer and a card, like Hermes, he is neither king nor jack, but rather

cept of Derrida's "deconstruction" long postdates Kierkegaard, I would call Kierkegaard's philosophy a "dialectic of disintegration", because it does not integrate the self first and foremost, but dis-integrates the self and disperses and dissolves it into his theatrical philosophy which opens up human existence rather than closes it before any condition of faith or decision.

3. The Crisis of the Philosopher, the Actress and the Modern Age

In this final section, I will say a few words about Kierkegaard's essay "The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress",[34] because, as stated already in the first paragraph, all seven aspects of the dramatic philosopher – as experimental and dissident – are present. Also, this essay reveals Kierkegaard as the dramatic philosopher both reflecting on the subject – the particular artist in question; and being the subject itself under scrutiny by the pseudonym Inter et Inter, the philosopher of the interlude. There is the general crisis of the author ('the crisis') caught between the aesthetic and the religious and his writing caught between confession and deception. This is the grand philosophical theatre of the self at work, in the conflicting endeavour of unifying and multiplying the self. I cite here a passage from Inter et Inter which is also quoted in full by Gillian Rose in her own analysis of the essay in her brilliant book *The Broken Middle*:

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a sort of joker, a floating signifier, a wild card, one who puts play into play" (Derrida 1993: 93). In perhaps his most crucial passage (which is significantly inserted as a footnote) in explaining his terms "dissemination" and "outwork" in his book *Dissemination*, Derrida refers to *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* as one of the key examples of a paradoxical text or paratext that neither really begins or ends as "highly differentiated in its structure [...] to all possible treatises [...] on the post-scriptum" (Derrida 1993: 27). In this same passage, reflecting on the great texts of the interlude or interval and digression, Derrida writes: "[...] one is also in fact starting over again, adding an extra text, complicating the scene, opening up within the labyrinth a supplementary digression, which is also a false mirror that pushes the labyrinth's infinity back forever in mimed – that is, endless – speculation" (ibid. 27).

[34] There was also a plan to have this essay included in a volume called *The Writings of a Young Man*, where in the preface Kierkegaard would appear as a young author publishing his first book, and he would be called Felix de St. Vincent. The contents were to include: 1. The Crisis in the Life of an Actress 2. A Eulogy on Autumn 3. Rosenkilde as Hummer 4.Writing Sample (See Kierkegaard 1997: xv [Pap. VIII I A 339]).

> Just for that reason, all truly unworthy [*unyttige*], that is, unselfish [*uegennyttige*] servants of the truth, whose life is sheer struggle with the sophisms of existence, whose concern is not how one can best come out of it oneself but how one can most truly serve the truth and in truth benefit people – they have known how to use [*benytte*] illusions: in order to test people.[35]

The question is – when does one take off the mask or cease to deceive? And what is taking off the mask? We return again to the problem of Peer Gynt of confessing and concealing. While each one of us is enthralled by the possibility of the plurality of the subject at the theatre that Constantin Constantius so evocatively describes, the Judge of *Either/Or: Part II* also beautifully describes the imminent day in standing naked before oneself and the audience:

> Are you not aware that there comes a midnight hour when everyone must unmask; do you believe that life will always allow itself to be trifled with; do you believe that one can sneak away just before midnight in order to avoid it? Or are you not dismayed by it? I have seen people in life who have deceived others for such a long time that eventually they are unable to show their true nature. I have seen people who have played hide-and-seek so long that at last in a kind of lunacy they force their secret thoughts on others just as loathsomely as they proudly had concealed them from them earlier. Or can you think of anything more appalling then having it all end with the disintegration of your essence into a multiplicity, so that you actually became several, just as that unhappy demoniac became a legion, and thus you would have lost what is the most inward and holy in a human being, the binding power of the personality?[36]

Perhaps though, in being and becoming a human being, the cycle of masking and unmasking never ends, and as a Hollywood executive says in Woody Allen's meta-film, a film in which film itself becomes the subject of the movie: "The real ones want their lives fictional, and the fictional ones want their lives real."[37] Analogous to Allen's meta-film, Kierkegaard can be viewed as a meta-author – an author in which authorship itself becomes the subject of the author. All acting is communication – revealing and concealing, and

[35] Kierkegaard 1997: 315 / SKS14, 101. See also Rose 1992: 20.

[36] Kierkegaard 1987b: 160 / SKS3, 357.

[37] Allen 1985.

Kierkegaard's analysis of the actress is a mirroring of his authorship. This essay becomes a moment where Kierkegaard is able to look at his own work and the challenge of being an artist, while also providing more gravitas in confronting temporality and the "age of disintegration", and triumphing as a human being in repetition through transformation or metamorphosis. In modernism and the landscape of the modern self, masks are everywhere, acting as projections, distortions and moments of great clarity. Finally, Kierkegaard anticipates existential ethics of the twentieth century philosopher and successful dramatist Jean-Paul Sartre, when Climacus states that "the subjective thinker is not a scientist-scholar [*Videnskabsmand*]; he is an artist. To exist is an art."[38]

As Crites points out, Kierkegaard's last "aesthetic" pseudonym – Inter et Inter – "suggests the intermission at the theatre" and "an interlude between the religious works which now comprise Kierkegaard's main task".[39] But perhaps the irony here is on Kierkegaard, who may see this essay as far less significant to the main act which is meant to be his formidable religious works, as akin to the way he ironically presented *Fear and Trembling* and *Either/Or* as "insignificant" to the main act of philosophy which are supposed to be Hegel's large tomes of the philosophy of *Geist*, *Sittlichkeit*, logic, history and religion. To great philosophical systems, *Either/Or* was a mere "fragment of life", *Fear and Trembling* was written by an *Extra-Skriver*, Johannes Climacus' great philosophical work was a mere "postscript", and *Repetition* was only an "experimental venture". Perhaps then, Inter et Inter and his essay, which are located on the margins of Kierkegaard's marginal philosophy, can actually hold centre stage as a grand interlude.

Working as critic, performer, philosopher and spectator, the author analyses Johanne Luise Heiberg, the famous actress in Copenhagen and the wife of Denmark's leading man of letters, Johan Ludvig Heiberg. The text is written sometime in 1847 and published, after much procrastination, in the revolutionary year of 1848 (24–27 July) between two works written under

[38] Kierkegaard 1992: 351 / SKS7, 320. For an example of Sartre's fusing of becoming a moral self and the artist, see, for example his lecture "Existentialism and Humanism" from 1945 (Sartre 1994: 48–50): "Rather let us say that the moral choice is comparable to the construction of a work of art […] There is this in common between art and morality, that in both we have to do with creation and invention […] Man makes himself; he is not found ready-made."

[39] Crites 1967: 129.

his own name – *Christian Discourses* and the three religious discourses under the title "The Lilies of the Field and Birds of the Air", and a few months before his diary entry on "the age of disintegration". The essay is published in four instalments in a supplement to the newspaper *The Fatherland*, the first instalment appearing directly below an article on the same page on the plight of the working class in Denmark. This may appear as a stark contrast but on deeper inspection it provides a poignant reminder of the tensions, relation and dichotomy between the crowd and the individual, where the individual drama and the mass historical drama are unfolding. An example such as this particular page of the newspaper is setting Kierkegaard and Marx side by side amidst the revolutionary politics of 1848 and the beginning of real power on the political stage for the people – whether that be as a crowd or as an individual.

Thus, Inter et Inter analyses the relation between the faceless public and the vulnerable individual, the audience and the performer, and the border-concept of anxiety (which is that state between freedom and necessity, desire and fear, time and eternity)[40] made concrete in the challenges of being a performer offstage and onstage. The dramatic artist is always anxious offstage where the audience is awaiting and ready to judge; but onstage she is always calm.[41] The dramatic artist changes this anxiety, which is a burden, into lightness in action onstage: "[...] the weight of the burden continually transforms itself into lightness." Inter et Inter explains that it is not "casting off burdens", but that "one soars high and free by means of – a pressure".[42] He treats the reading public as the theatrical audience (which the author, like the actress, has to deal with) and begins with a critical remark on the demand of the crowd in the "newspaper critics" that "is dreadfully shabby"[43]

[40] See the complex thesis on the border-concept of anxiety by Kierkegaard's pseudonym Vigilius Haufnienis in *The Concept of Anxiety*: "Anxiety is *a sympathetic antipathy* and *an antipathetic sym*pathy" (Kierkegaard 1980a: 42 / SKS4, 348); "Anxiety is neither a category of necessity nor a category of freedom; it is entangled freedom, where freedom is not free in itself but entangled, not by necessity, but in itself" (ibid. 49 / 354); The moment is that ambiguity [*Tvetydige*] in which time and eternity touch each other" (ibid. 89 / 392).

[41] Kierkegaard 1997: 313 / SKS14, 99.

[42] ibid. 312 / SKS14, 99.

[43] ibid. 303 / SKS14, 93.

and "half-witted reviewers",[44] and on the fickleness of the public in its impatient boredom through the "habit of admiration"[45] and its thirst for the immediate. Kierkegaard has a long troubled relationship with journalism firing off tirades to this new, expanding and influential media. But he responds to what he sees is and will be "the age of disintegration" – he engages with it, knowing that the tyranny and half-truths of mass media is the future, where often it is not the truth that matters but who gets the news out first and what will sell more. Thus, rather than turning his back on the demon of journalism, he confronts and enters it, and becomes a public figure himself in his last act, when he causes small ripples in the media world of Copenhagen in distributing copies of his pamphlet *The Moment* [*Øieblikket*].

There is the second crisis in the essay – that particular crisis ("a crisis") of the actress, where temporality can be less kind to physical, carefree beauty, as she transforms into a greater artist. The public or audience wants to keep Johanne Luise Heiberg as this same beautiful young girl as object of desire even when she comes to play Juliet fourteen years later in her thirties. Yet, the esteemed actress's performance on stage turns her inwardness into a more graceful and greater performance than the first time, achieving youth a second time. More convincing than his earlier attempts at repetition, Kierkegaard succeeds in facing and living with repetition through metamorphosis for the artist and for himself as dramatic philosopher. Inter et Inter introduces a new form of metamorphosis that he detects in the actress in confronting "the age of disintegration" – of levelling, admiration, envy and immediacy. Of course, physically the actress is transformed so it is at the second time in playing Juliet that she must mature as an actress, regain youth a second time, and rather than simply being youthfulness personified. She is now performing that youthfulness from a distance, or, in other words, is capturing that youthfulness by her skills, experience, transformation and belief in her capacities as an actress and as a human being. Her crisis and the author's crisis is an opportunity for transformative repetition to actually happen alongside Kierkegaard's earlier writings circling around faith or that "inner certainty that anticipates infinity".[46] If we take the essay of Inter

[44] ibid. 305 / SKS14, 94.

[45] ibid. 318 / SKS14, 103.

[46] Kierkegaard 1980: 156.

et Inter seriously, then Kierkegaard has made an adjustment and corrective to Johannes de silentio's impossible faith in leaping over the *confinium*[47] and "boundary of the unknown territory"[48] and Constantin's "border of the marvellous",[49] with the inclusion of transformation or metamorphosis. The poet David Whyte memorably explains that there is

> [….] an extraordinary key to transformation. […] You only have to know the frontiers, where simply by being at that frontier, you come alive. […] Youth, in a sense, is fated to grow older in the world. It's fated to come to understand its imperfections. And I think one of the great triumphs of human existence and one of the tasks of adulthood is actually to grow younger again, to find that youthfulness at each stage of our existence. There is a radical edge that is available to us no matter whether we're 20, 30, 40, 50 or 60. It just looks different at each stage.[50]

This metamorphosis and transformative repetition gives the dramatic philosopher and the actress the tools to flourish and communicate the evolving and repetitive theatre of the self in the "age of disintegration" – which is a third "crisis". This third crisis is a crisis of the world – a crisis of belief and philosophical ideas, culture, the spreading of information and mass media, and the socio-political and economic society, where Kierkegaard writes in his journal: "That it was the age of disintegration – an age of crisis, that history was about to take a turn."[51]

Conclusion

From his central performance in his earlier pseudonymous authorship to the final dramatic provocation and praxis in presenting himself on the Copenhagen streets waving his series *The Moment*, Kierkegaard's theatre of the self – combining the philosophical, artistic, critical and performative – is experimental and dissident to the end, and brings us to the frontiers of

[47] Kierkegaard 1983: 83 / SKS4, 173.

[48] ibid. 112 / 200.

[49] ibid. 185 / 55.

[50] Whyte 2003: Disc 2, track 16 and 29.

[51] Kierkegaard 1996: 350 [1848: IX B 63: 7].

life and disciplines. And by being in the presence and working along these frontiers, his authorship as dramatic philosophy allows for a richer, more nuanced understanding and unfolding of the elusive human self. I will end this essay with the description by Inter et Inter of the actress's restlessness which reveals the combination of transformation and faith in the artist, the style of the dramatic philosopher, and finally the theatre of the self that we all find ourselves in and which Kierkegaard has invited us to observe, recognise, enter and exit:

> Restlessness [*Uro*], in the sense of the hubbub of finitude, soon palls; but restlessness in the pregnant sense, the restlessness of infinity, the joyous, robust originality that, rejuvenating, invigorating, healing, stirs the water is a great rarity, and it is in this sense that she is restlessness. Yet in turn this restlessness signifies something, and something very great; it signifies the first fieriness of an essential genius. And this restlessness does not signify anything accidental; it does not mean that she cannot stand still; on the contrary, it signifies that even when she is standing still one has an intimation of this inner restlessness, but, note well, in repose. It does not mean that she comes running onto the stage; on the contrary, it means that when she is merely moving one has an intimation of the impetus of infinity. It does not mean that she talks so fast that one cannot follow her; on the contrary, it means that when she speaks very slowly one senses the animation and inspiration. This restlessness does not mean that she must very soon become tired; just the opposite, it discloses an elementary indefatigableness, like that of the wind, of the sounds of nature; it discloses that her roguishness is inexhaustibly rich, so that it continually only betrays that she possesses ever so much more; it discloses that her coquetry (and a character such as this utterly without coquetry is unthinkable) is nothing else than a happy, innocent mind's joyful, triumphant awareness of its indescribable good fortune.[52]

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EITHER/OR AS A CASE OF EXPERIMENTATION IN THE SUB-GENRE *BILDUNGSROMAN* [1]

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Abstract
My claim is that *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life* can be read as an experiment in the *Bildungsroman* genre where the reader (or reader-spectator, as I will explain) is the actual hero of the novel. The usual voyage of a hero in the *Bildungsroman* involves leaving home behind, finding oneself homeless or at least with no definite abode, and then on the return home, realizing that one has changed hopefully for the better, having learned about the world during this voyage, about one's relation with one's self and others, and obviously having experienced love. In *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life*, the reader becomes the hero of the *Bildungsroman* and in its pages she finds the scenarios for her wanderings. Indeed, the unfolding of these scenarios, together with the conflation of theatrical effects in *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life*, allow us to read the intended sequence of formative episodes of this unique work as a successful case of experimentation in a narrative genre. The reader-spectator is thus a reader in the process of becoming more self-conscious, more capable of assuming a leading role in the process of appropriation or un-appropriation of what is put forward in *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life* and in the intellectual panorama of that time.

Keywords
Reader-spectator, theatricality, *Either/Or*, *Bildungsroman*

In comparison to other titles in Kierkegaard's oeuvre, *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life* seems to present no great difficulties, to the point that most readers and critics often neglect the second part, as if it were a negligible sub-title.[2]

[1] This article re-elaborates material included in my article "The single individual as reader-spectator," in *Revista de Estudios Kierkegaardianos*, n. 1. Mexico: Universidad Ibero-Americana, pp. 169–190.

[2] The most intricate titles are no doubt these two: *The Concept of Anxiety. A Simple*

But the truth is that *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life* raises some questions concerning the second half of the title, all the more so since it is a work in two parts bearing exactly the same title, despite being written by five different authors simply. Moreover, "enten-eller / *aut-aut*" would eventually become a leitmotif in Kierkegaard's writings, in particular in the *Journals and Notebooks*, with the disjunction gaining both a metonymical and a metaphorical meaning.

At a first glance, I dare say that one might expect to read the plural and not the singular, i.e. "fragments of life" instead of "a fragment of life." In fact, throughout one's life, as it evolves, this *aut-aut* borders one's path continually; hence, a succession of moments of choice can hardly be described as "a fragment of life." On the other hand, to take "a fragment of life" as an attribute to be applied only to the five authors (Victor Eremita, A, B [B is the Judge – the author of two long letters to A which form Part II], Johannes the Seducer, and the pastor from Jutland), or to any of the three editors (Victor Eremita – the editor of the whole work; A – the editor of "The Seducer's Diary," and B – the editor of "Ultimatum") does not prove to be sensible, since it is obvious that the presentation of each of their contributions, and what is represented in these contributions, falls into the category of a life view, which points to a protracted time. The same applies to the immense gallery of characters from books, plays or operas, mythological and historical creatures, occasional passers-by, narrators, editors, and addressees, who populate the two parts of *Either/Or*. This can be so disturbing that, commonly, many critics just drop them off, and quote a character (or an author or an editor) as if the statement had been said by Kierkegaard himself. Moreover, these characters usually make more than one choice, or decide not to make it or to postpone it, or to experiment before making a choice, or may be shown as examples of life-long consequences of a choice, usually a bad one. In addition, and despite their diverse natures and derivations, characters from various mythological and literary backgrounds may be joined together by the similarity of their patterns of choice, and by the flexibility in the role they play. They can be the actual theme of a chapter or section of chapter

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Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin; and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. A Mimical-Pathetical-Dialectical Compilation. An Existential Contribution*.

(Emmeline); or leave the context of the source-text and become new characters (such as Marie Beaumarchais from Goethe's *Clavigo*, Margarete from Goethe's *Faust* and Donna Elvira from Mozart's *Don Giovanni*); or perform in their archetypal role (such as Don Juan and other mythological and biblical figures), and so on.

In light of this, my initial guiding line was a dual question: Why "*a* fragment of life"? And if this "*Either/Or*" is a fragment of life of an agent in the process of creating a work, who does it apply to or who is more entitled to appropriate it? It is not the authors/editors, since their contributions are presented as life-views pointing to a protracted time; it is not the characters, for what they share is a heterogeneity of choice (especially in the reason for choice) and a narrative role, but not exactly a "fragment" of life; and it is not even Kierkegaard, as author of the authors, all the more so because the diversity of styles and genres present in the work point to a complex genesis of the texts.[3]

Let us consider now the reader as the agent who lives a fragment of life intensely while reading this particular kind of novel seen by Kierkegaard as the point of departure for his entire authorship. The reader is in fact the sole instance that can bring a unity to the structure of the work while at the same time can become the single individual in his personal process of reading. What kind of unity, achieved in the act of reading, will this reader be able to give to *Either/Or*? It does not have to do with themes or categories – they are too diverse, sometimes taken too antagonistically, to even allow a cohesive approach or description of this work. It is, instead, the recognition of the unity of idea and matter (content and form) and the full admission of the need for a unity of presentation and representation. This forms the basis of transparency, which becomes a fundamental tool in the process of choosing oneself ethically (as the Judge defends),[4] but also aesthetically, with Johannes

[3] Henning Fenger, *Kierkegaard, The Myths and their Origins. Studies in the Kierkegaardian papers and letters*, trans. by George C. Schoolfield, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976; here, p. 14. First published as *Kierkegaard-Myter og Kierkegaard-Kilder. 9 kildekritiske studier i de Kierkegaardske papirer, breve og aktstykker*, Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag, 1976.

[4] SKS 3, pp. 157, 174, 184, 236, 242, 246 / EO II, pp. 160, 179, 190, 248, 253, 254, 258. The two volumes *of Enten-Eller. Et Livs-Fragment* are referred to as SKS 2 and SKS 3 in the Danish edition, and the Howard V. Hong English translation are referred to as EO I and EO II.

the Seducer being perhaps the exception that confirms the rule.[5]

To develop this fully would lead me astray from my present purpose. But it is worth mentioning some points which help to clarify the development of my argument:

- Heterogeneous as they are, the two parts and their chapters form a whole that is absolutely inimitable. *Either/Or* is so unique in its unity of idea and matter (content and form) that it does not fit into any philosophical or literary genre. It is like the reception piece that A talks about in the chapter on the musical-erotic. It is not a reception piece that allows the apprentice to join the league of artists, but rather a reception piece like Mozart's *Don Giovanni*, one that allows the artist to join the immortals.[6]

- The apparently endless list of characters taken from all ages and periods of the History of Literature, of Philosophy, of mankind, is joined by the creation of fictional characters comprehending the authors and the editors, and the characters of "The Seducer's Diary," and the ones that pop up in many chapters. They all belong to what I am tempted to call Kierkegaard's mythology or Kierkegaard's reign of gods. They always present themselves as representatives of a category, or type – it can be a philosophical category (B, the Judge, representing the ethical), a crystallization of the psychic seducer (Johannes), or the quintessence of romantic comedy (Scribe). Once they emerge on the page and present themselves before the eyes of the reader, she knows what they stand for. It is true that some of these characters reappear later in Kierkegaard's oeuvre with slightly different features, but in *Either/Or* the modulation of characters hardly exists.

My claim then is that accepting the reader as the one entitled to take the work as a fragment of her own life enables us to realize that *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life* can be interpreted as a case of experimentation in the

[5] The trio of women in "Silhouettes" and the final fate of the characters of Scribe's play *Les Premiers Amours* are examples, amongst others, of aesthetic choices which are choices for oneself.

[6] SKS 2, pp. 55–60 / EO I, pp. 47–50.

sub-genre *Bildungsroman*. I start by highlighting three kinds of appeals to the reader's active role in the interplay between reader and author as performed by various authorial instances throughout the two parts of the book. This will lead us to the concept of reader-spectator. I will then draw attention to the presence of the idea of *Bildung* in *Either/Or*, and finally, to the possibility of reading the work as an experimentation in the *Bildungsroman* sub-genre. I conclude by giving examples of staging effects or theatrical strategies in the work, which underscore the tasks assigned to the reader-spectator, and its development of a hero in this unusual *Bildungsroman*.

1.

Eremita closes the Preface with the imagined advice to the reader given by A and B:[7]

> A presumably would have no objection to the publication of the papers, and he probably would shout to the reader, "Read them or do not read them, you will regret it either way." […] [B] perhaps would address the book with these words: "Go out into the world, then; avoid, if possible, the attention of the critics; visit an individual reader in a favorably disposed hour; […] in this book you will find something that you perhaps should not know, something else from which you will presumably benefit by coming to know it. Read, then, the something in such a way that, having read it, you may be as one who has not read it; read the something else in such a way that, having read it, you may be as one who has not forgotten what has been read." As editor, I shall add only the wish that the book may meet the reader in a favorably disposed hour and that the charming reader may succeed in scrupulously following B's well-intentioned advice.

A and B use disjunctive statements to advise the reader. Curiously enough, it is A who expresses regret and B who stresses the predominance of knowledge over the possible harms of reading, thus somehow twisting the purity of the heart of the reader. Whether Eremita as the editor, or the many critics that will subsequently scrutinize the book, want the reader to follow B's advice is another question. But what comes out from both pieces of advice is that all the work revolves around the *aut-aut*.

[7] SKS 2, pp. 21–22/EO I, pp. 14–15.

In my view, the reader, by being aware of the *aut-aut* from the very beginning of her reading of the work, is the agent that can give unity to the work. For this purpose, she cannot be the reader who reads only selected parts of *Either/Or*. We all remember Kierkegaard's reaction, via Eremita, to J. L. Heiberg's review, blaming him for not paying equal attention to all the chapters in the two parts.[8] In fact, Heiberg, and many readers afterwards, failed to realize that what is presented in the sequence of scenarios in both parts, which may be conflicting or contradictory, is the representation of aesthetic and ethical issues which in turn, in their dissimilarity, seem antagonistic because their basis and subsequent implications reflect differentiated philosophical, literary, religious, educational and stylistic sources and structures.

This type of fragmentary reading is arbitrary reading, to use A's terms. It is worth re-reading A's words where he addresses the topic with an implicit forewarning:

> It is popularly believed that there is no art to being arbitrary, and yet it takes profound study to be arbitrary in such a way that a person does not himself run wild in it but himself has pleasure from it. One does not enjoy the immediate object but something else that one arbitrarily introduces. One sees the middle of a play; one reads the third section of a book. One thereby has enjoyment quite different from what the author so kindly intended. One enjoys something totally accidental; one considers the whole of existence from this standpoint; one lets its reality run aground on this.[9]

As A points out, arbitrary reading, at its best, stays at the level of the lowest kind of aesthetic. The reception of *Either/Or* tells us that, since arbitrary reading leaves whole chapters (sometimes one of the parts) ignored, it fails to see the major role that theatre, theatrical illusions and effects, and staging, play in *Either/Or*. In using "stage" and "staging", I follow Carl Hughes in his work *Kierkegaard and the Staging of Desire*, although I object to the fact that he confines the effects of the theatre to the elicitation of desire.[10]

[8] "Taksigelse to Hr. Professor Heiberg"/"A word of thanks to Professor Heiberg" (05.03.1843), in SKS 14, pp. 55–57; here, p. 55/COR, 17–21; here, p. 17. SKS 14 designates the volume dedicated to press articles; COR designates vol. XIII of Kierkegaard's Writings, *The Corsair Affair*.

[9] SKS 2, p. 288/ EO I, p. 299.

[10] Carl Hughes argues that "even Kierkegaard's most explicitly religious writings employ the techniques of the theatre in order to produce what Kierkegaard sees as theatre's signature

For this type of staging to be recognized, the reader has to become a reader-spectator, that is, one that manages to decode what is being staged along 764 pages, one that can realize that what is presented and represented are actions which, quoting Hughes once more, "anticipate or [are] preparatory to a second, greater action after or beyond it." This reader-spectator sees her strategies of reading confirmed by the words of A in his introduction to "The Seducer's Diary," when, as editor, he expresses the following advice, which will later prove to be decisively helpful to read the Judge's letters. Here what matters is the luminosity of a theatre and not the obscurity of a cave:

> Behind the world in which we live, far in the background, lies another world, and the two have about the same relation to each other as do the stage proper and the stage one sometimes sees behind it in the theatre. Through a hanging of fine gauze, one sees, as it were, a world of gauze, lighter, more ethereal, with a quality different from that of the actual world. Many people who appear physically in the actual world are not at home in it but are at home in that other world.[11]

2.

Empowering the reader at this level is the necessary step to make her the master of her own life, decisions and choices. This can also be expressed, in the spirit of the time, as follows: what is at stake is a process of forming the reader, of making her aware that she is responsible for her own *Bildung*. And, as we see in the next quote from the Judge's first letter ("The Esthetic Validity of Marriage"), there is no possibility of an inner story without the aesthetic. As in the previous quote, it is the language of theatre that is used:

> Here I am at the summit of the esthetic. And in truth, he who has humility and courage enough to let himself be esthetically transformed, he who feels himself present as a character in a drama the deity is writing, in which the poet and the prompter are not different persons, in which the individual, as the experienced actor who has lived into his character and his lines is

effect: the elicitation of desire." See *Kierkegaard and the Staging of Desire. Rhetoric and Performance in a Theology of Eros*, p. 6.

[11] SKS 2, pp. 295–296/EO I, p. 306.

> not disturbed by the prompter but feels that he himself wants to say what is being whispered to him, so that it almost becomes a question whether he is putting the words in the prompter's mouth or the prompter in his, he who in the most profound sense feels himself creating and created, who in the moment he feels himself creating has the original pathos of the lines, and in the moment he feels himself created has the erotic ear that picks up every sound – he and he alone has brought into actual existence the highest in esthetics.
>
> But this history that proves to be incommensurable even for poetry is the inner history. This has the idea within itself and precisely therefore is the esthetic. Therefore it begins, as I expressed it, with the possession, and its progress is the acquiring of this possession. It is an eternity in which the temporal has not disappeared as an ideal element, but in which it is continually present as a real element. Thus, when patience acquires itself in patience, it is inner history.[12]

In the next letter ("The Balance between the Esthetic and the Ethical in the Development of Personality") the dialectic between interiority and exteriority becomes clear when the Judge explains how one can be "esthetically transformed" and reach self-judgment:

> So when I have encountered something in life, when I have decided on something that I was afraid would take on another aspect for me in the course of time, when I have done something I was afraid I would interpret differently in the course of time, I often wrote down briefly and clearly what it was that I wanted or what it was that I had done and why. Then when I felt that I needed it, when my decision or my action was not as vivid to me, I would take out my charter and judge myself.[13]

And later in the same chapter, the Judge details this transformation of the self as an act of procreation:

> Through the individual's intercourse with himself the individual is made pregnant by himself and gives birth to himself. The self the individual knows is simultaneously the actual self and the ideal self, which the individual has outside himself as the image in whose likeness he is to form himself, and which on the other hand he has within himself, since it is he himself.[14]

[12] SKS 3, pp. 133–136/EO II, pp. 137–138.

[13] SKS 3, pp. 190–191/EO II, p. 197.

[14] SKS 3, pp. 246–247/EO II, p. 259.

Hence, we have a reader, a reader-spectator, who has read *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life* and, in the sequence of scenarios, characters and plots, and political, philosophical, literary and religious discussions that she has encountered, she has found enough matter to write her inner story inspired by the intended sequence of formative episodes, and then to judge herself. The reader becomes the possibility of the work being read as a novel of formation, in the sense that, in case she reads the whole work, she is the one that stands a better chance of transformation. Without leaving her reading place physically, the truth is that right from the "*Diapsalmata*" until the end of the "Ultimatum" she embarks on a journey during which her mind, all her faculties of reason and judgment, her senses and her sensibility, get involved in the typical experiences of the hero of the *Bildungsroman*. The Judge would say that she feels herself created and creating.

Would this be sufficient to claim that *Either/Or* is an experiment in the *Bildungsroman* genre? Once we consider the theatrical effects evident in the structure of this work, we can accept that it is a case of transformation, of metamorphosis, of a typical *Bildungsroman*.

In the plot of the prototype, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship Years* by Goethe, theatre plays a crucial role in the voyage of the hero. Wilhelm leaves home, finds himself with no definite abode, comes across different mentors while trying different jobs and roles in the world of theatre (which includes being mentor), experiments in various theatrical activities, until he finally realizes that he has changed for the better, has learned about the world, about one's relation with one's self and others, with the experiences of love (along different planes, i.e., brotherly, fatherly, sensual, and a general love for mankind) also assuming the decisive role. In a very idiosyncratic fashion, *Either/Or* contains all these elements. The chapters stage themes and ideas, by means of introducing characters which become presentations/representations of experimentation in thought, against what we may call a contextual background which best highlights the issue in question. But if we had to choose a dominant character, it would have to be A – he is omnipresent in both parts, in the first as the author of most of the chapters and editor of "The Seducer's Diary" and in the second, as the addressee of the Judge's letters. Yet, he stands as a representative of the formation of men

who choose not to choose themselves, in the Judge's terms,[15] and this would rule him out of being a hero in the image of Wilhelm Meister. But the reader, as mentioned above, can be an agent who assumes the task of the typical hero of the *Bildungsroman*, once we take her as reader-spectator, as a member of an audience capable of deciphering the narrative strategy conceived by Kierkegaard, and recognizing the staging effects prepared by means of which he re-instates continuously the unity of matter and idea and the simultaneity of presentation and representation.

3.

Indeed, the structural plans that preside over the inner organization of the chapters and their position in the work resemble the stage of a baroque theatre, in which different types of panels (the wings, boarders, backdrops) depict variations of the settings. By using different combinations with one another, they produce the illusion of different times of the day, of interiors or exteriors, and so on, thus providing the adequate background for each scene.[16] These structural planes are not designed to fit one inside the other. On the contrary, they are supposed to be able to complement each other. In *Either/Or. A Fragment of Life*, the juxtaposition and interchangeability of these structural planes allows the reader never to be left with a sensation of discontinuity as she progresses from chapter to chapter, and from part to part. In addition, the focus of the reader is continuously held, and, at the same time her awareness of the presence of these theatrical effects allows her to keep the necessary distance for reflexivity. Here are some of the planes and structural bridges between chapters:

1. The first two chapters, "Diapsalmata" and "The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical Erotic," form the true introduction to the whole work. *Diapsalmata* provides a network of themes as thematic

[15] SKS 3, pp. 164–165/EO II, p.168.

[16] Baroque theatres still existed in Kierkegaard's day, and still exist today. The ones that he might have possibly known were the Hofteater in Christianborg Palace, in Copenhagen, which is now a museum; the Helsingør theatre which was dismantled in 1961 and reassembled in Århus, and is still working; and the Hoftheater at the Sanssouci Park in the Royal Palace in Potsdam.

orientation whereas the chapter on the musical-erotic provides the theoretical and practical guidelines for what is meant by unity of matter and ideas, and by simultaneity of presentation and representation. This chapter also provides different patterns of pieces of literary criticism, from character analysis, to a comparative study between two theatrical versions of the myth of Don Juan, and an interart study involving the latter and Mozart's *Don Giovanni*. In addition, it also contains the master key to assessing the different types of seducers and seduced, from Don Juan, the seducer as deceiver, and Johannes, the psychical seducer, to Elvira and Cordelia, Faust and Margarete, Emmeline and Charles and Rinville, but also the Judge and his wife, thus placing the theme of relational love as a permanent subtext in the whole work.

2. Four chapters in Part I develop their own topic(s) along the discussion of dramatic genres – opera, vaudeville, ancient tragedy versus modern tragedy, and comedy. They are: "The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical Erotic," "The Tragic in Ancient Drama reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama," "Silhouettes," and "The First Love."

3. The chapter on the tragic and "Silhouettes" form another level of complementarity with "The Unhappiest One." In addition, all these chapters share a common narrative pattern which consists in a bipartite or tripartite division, as in the chapter on the musical erotic and in "Silhouettes". Usually after a brief address to the reader or to members of the fellowship of the dead, there is an introductory section where a category and/or some theoretical discussion, usually concerning art-related issues, is presented, and then the second part may be called an exercise in practical criticism, carried out in multifarious ways.

4. The Judge moves forward and joins A in the profuse use of dramatic references to support his claims. This is also a theatrical strategy to hold the focus of the reader. Contrary to the modern reader, who now has to dig into the universe of these intruding allusions, references or

characters, unless she deliberately misses the full meaning of the context they visit, in Kierkegaard's Copenhagen the theatre was the most popular form of entertainment, and theatrical allusions or references were as easy to recognize as biblical ones.

5. A theatrical framework is also introduced in "The Rotation of Crops," with one of the longest and most curious epigraphs in Kierkegaard's writings – a page-long sequence of lines from Aristophanes's *Plutos*, in the original Greek, and in the German translation.

6. "The First Love" and "The Unhappiest One" provide the setting and the props for the Judge's letters. In "The First Love," A introduces the category of occasion, unexpendable for the process of becoming a critic, and for any reflection on the issue of the first love. "The Unhappiest One," brief as it is, introduces this theme in the first paragraph, and before the final parade of candidates for the title, the idea is discussed from a philosophical point of view, starting with Hegel's idea of unhappy consciousness and followed by a detailed explanation of the reciprocal effects of the interaction between recollection and hope. All these topics will be re-elaborated by the Judge in his letters in his own process of becoming the most attentive spectator of A's deeds.

7. Note well the perfectly timed sequence of scenes contained in the Preface: Victor Eremita's comings and goings around town until his passion makes him succumb to the secretary; Eremita violating the secrets of the secretary; two dueling pistols substituted for the papers, the idyllic forest where Eremita reads the papers; and the stagecoach, the inn, the innkeeper, etc.

When I associate the reader-spectator with *Either/Or* as an experiment in the *Bildungsroman*, the conflation of the theatrical effects here exemplified is perhaps the decisive narrative strategy. Taken together, they let us see how the unity of this heterogeneous work is achieved, and on the other hand enable the reader to truly understand the very last lines of the work, which

come from the *loud and powerful* voice of the pastor resounding from the stage of the Jutland heath:

> Do not interrupt the flight of your soul; do not distress what is best in you; do not enfeeble your spirit with half wishes and half thoughts. Ask yourself and keep on asking until you find the answer, for one may have known something many times, acknowledged it; one may have willed something many times, attempted it – and yet, only the deep inner motion, only the heart's indescribable emotion, only that will convince you that what you have acknowledged belongs to you, that no power can take it from you – for only the truth that builds up is truth for you.[17]

Victor Eremita will not be the only one to have felt a sense of victory with A's and B's papers in his hands. In the inevitable solitude of her reading, the reader-spectator will feel as victorious as he did.

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[17] SKS 3, p. 332/EO II, p. 354.

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